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INTRODUCTION

The razing of Jericho; the sack of Magdeburg; the siege of Leningrad; the fire-bombing of Dresden. Ever since civilizations began organizing permanent economic settlements, cities and towns
have occupied a central role in warfare and in our images of war.
"On almost every page of historical writings," remarked Grotius,
"you may find accounts of the destruction of whole cities, or the
leveling of walls to the ground, the devastation of fields, and conflagrations."1 A driving force behind the evolution and development of cities has been defense and security. 2 As a result, however, cities have become a primary target or object of war,
exposing their residents to all the ravages and privations of conflict.
While the targeting of cities has remained a constant in warfare,
the political role of cities within the nation-state has shifted. The
centralization of authority during the past several centuries made
states the primary political unit comprising the international system, while economic development and nationalism made cities integral to the functioning of that modern state. As the strategic
significance of cities, and the value military planners place on their
protection or capture, has changed, so too have the customs and

1. HUGO GROTIUs, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS LIBRI TREs 468 (Francis W. Kelsey
trans., 1928) (1646).
2. See Richard Bean, War and the Birth of the Nation State, 33 J. ECON. HIsT. 203, 20708 (1973). Max Weber also provides an intriguing account of the origin of cities, arguing
that military defenses represented an essential element of urban communities. See MAX
WEBER, THE CITY 75-80 (Don Martindale & Gertrud Neuwirth trans. & eds., 1958).
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international legal norms that govern how cities were to be treated
during hostilities.
The recent conflict in the former Yugoslavia casts in stark relief
the constantly evolving interplay of the law and strategy of cityattacks. Protracted sieges of barricaded population centers and
shellings of low-lying towns from the surrounding hillsides dominated the headlines. Although the conflict generated intense debate in the West about the strength of international humanitarian
norms half a century after Nuremberg, scholars have neglected to
explore what the strategic logic that drove the conduct of the war
portends for the viability of the international regime as a constraint on military operations.
The historical development of cities, strategy, and law cannot be
fully understood in isolation. The development of cities, and
changes in their political significance within the nation-state, drove
strategy; but strategy also spurred certain patterns of urban
growth, and therefore influenced the development of cities.3 Legal
norms concerning attack and surrender both constrained and, on
occasion, reinforced certain strategies aimed at conquering nationstates via the attack or capture of cities. At the same time, the
changing role of cities within the nation-state and emergence of
military technologies has caused dramatic shifts in these legal regimes. The three evolutions-the historical development of cities,
strategy, and law-thus form a triadic structure, each one influencing and influenced by the other two.
An examination of this triadic structure reveals that cities have
often served as a medium through which the threat of terror travels. Images of war's destructiveness frequently revolve around the
plight of cities, and throughout history war-makers have harnessed
these effects to propagate certain strategies. Moreover, this
transmission of terror has at various times been facilitated by customary or legal regimes.
The Yugoslav conflict presents an extraordinary case for examining this triadic relationship because the warring parties' use
of
siege methods transposes a style of warfare dominant four centuries earlier onto a modern political and legal canvass. To understand how the triadic relationship played out in the conflict, and
how it will likely evolve in the future, it is useful to step back in
time and explore how the law and strategy of siege warfare were
borne out of early modem European political transformations and
3. See Bean, supranote 2, at 207-08.
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how they have evolved since then. This paper is therefore organized around three episodes that illuminate the triadic relationship
at key moments in this historical evolution: the Duke of Alva's attempt to subdue the Dutch Revolt (1572-1573); General William
T. Sherman's march through the Confederate South (1864-65);
and the Allied bombing of Germany (1943-45). The paper then
applies the observations derived from these episodes to a fourth,
more recent episode: Serb efforts to conquer portions of Croatia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-95).
One limitation of this analysis is that its selection of the four
campaigns restricts it to instances of "total war"-warfare affecting and requiring the mobilization of the entire nation-state. The
purpose is not, however, to use these examples as emblematic of
all conflict in their respective eras. Indeed, one of the central
themes of this paper is that every era contains episodes that deviate from contemporary ethics and strategic logic. For instance,
only a few years after the Allied Coalition went to great lengths to
avoid collateral damage of Iraqi cities during Operation Desert
Storm,4 opposing forces in Bosnia waged wars of terror aimed
primarily at residents of major cities, reminiscent in many ways of
early modem siege warfare. The campaigns analyzed below have
instead been chosen for their emphasis on cities as targets and the
rich evidence that exists regarding the normative considerations
and theories of warfare held by the wars' architects.
This evidence provides the material from which to rebuild the
triadic structure of cities, strategy, and law in each era. Piecing together such evidence provides a picture of how changes in each of
these three elements drove changes in the other two. More importantly, it reveals that while the role of the city within the nationstate, and therefore within military strategic thought, has undergone revolutionary transformations during the past several centuries, the same principles and logic embodied in the legal regime
have reemerged. Despite a growing humanitarian movement since
WWII, the triadic relationship has changed far less than one might
expect.
4. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR, FINAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS 98-100 (1992) [hereinafter CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF
WAR]. But see MIDDLE EAST WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NEEDLESS DEATHS IN
THE GULF WAR 95-128 (1991) (arguing that Allied air attacks resulted in significant numbers of deaths among Iraqi civilians); Ariane L. DeSaussure, The Role of the Law of
Armed Conflict During the Persian Gulf War: An Overview, 37 AIR FORCE L. REV. 41, 68
(1994).
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To those who hold out the recent Rome accords calling for a
permanent war crimes tribunal as evidence that legal refinement
shapes the conduct of warring parties, this papers offers a competing view. Quite the contrary, the currents of the triadic relationship bode poorly for the present trajectory of international legal development as a shield for non-combatants. Although
prosecutorial tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
hint at institutionalization of human rights and civilian-protective
norms,5 the realities of modern armed conflict and the demands of
military strategy will, as in centuries past, exert strong pulls on the
development of international norms regulating attacks against urban centers.
III. CITIES AS TERRITORY: EARLY MODERN EUROPE AND
DUKE OF ALVA'S CAMPAIGN THROUGH THE NETHERLANDS

THE

A. The City in Early Modern Europe
As Western Europe entered the early modern age (roughly
1500), cities occupied a central role in political organization as well
as military strategy. Most major cities represented self-contained
political units, with their own administrative institutions and bureaucratic structures. At the same time, however, almost all cities
were subordinate to some larger political entity, commanded by
monarchical or imperial rule.6 This over-arching state would frequently emplace its own loyal magistrates and military garrison to
mediate between city and imperial government. 7
Among the most pressing challenges of imperial rulers was to
balance strict control over provinces and cities with sufficient
grants of autonomy to maintain local government support. This
balance was commonly achieved through systems of "privileges,"
whereby monarchs granted cities certain forms of independence in
return for allegiance and taxes.8 The quasi-autonomous role of
cities within states can thus be described as one of mutual dependence but also constant tension, as these two levels of political
authority competed for control of the cities and their residents.
5. See Aryeh Neier, A Forcefor WorldJustice, WASH. POST, May 27, 1998, at A17.
6. See CHRISTOPHER R. FRIEDRICHS, THE EARLY MODERN CITY, 1450-1750, at 44-46
(1995).
7. See CHRISTOPHER DUFFY, SIEGE WARFARE 254-55 (1979).
8. See FRIEDRICHS, supra note 6, at 50-53.
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"The relation between the towns and the central government was
a precarious balance of power."9
Failure to manage this tension could spell disaster for imperial
rulers.10 In an era when wars were primarily about territory, security required the acquisition and defense of strategically located
regions." This was impossible without establishing dominion over
major cities and towns. "Greatness of a Citie," observed the early
modem Italian scholar Giovanni Botero, "is tearmed not the spaciousnesse of scituation, or compasse of Walls; but the multitude
of Inhabitants, and their power."12 Cities provided armies with
food and other resources. Cities provided states with tax revenue
to fund these armies. And cities provided defensive infrastructure,
retaining fortifications built as far back as the third to fifth centuries. 3 In sum, warfare in early modem Europe generally turned
4
on controlling more cities than one's enemy.1
The centrality of cities to military strategy grew dramatically
during the sixteenth century as a result of revolutionary changes in
military technology. Among the most significant was the proliferation throughout Europe of novel fortification systems, modeled
after Italian experiments. The construction of lower, wider walls
virtually negated the effectiveness of bombardment. At the same
time, protruding outworks, or bastions, created intersecting fields
of fire against besieging forces, making direct assault costly and of-

9. MARTIN VAN GELDEREN, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE DUTCH REVOLT,

1555-1590, at 24 (1992) (discussing the political organization of the Dutch Provinces).
10. See, e.g., GEOFFREY PARKER, THE DUTCH REVOLT 14 (rev. ed. 1985) (illustrating

this tension in the Netherlands). For a primary account of political disputes between city
and central authority, see A Defence and True Declarationof the Things Lately Done in
the Low Country, Whereby May Easily Be Seen to Whom All the Beginning and Cause of
the Late Troubles and Calamities Is to be Imputed, 13, 57-58 (1571), reprinted in THE
DUTCH REVOLT (Martin Van Gelderen trans. & ed., 1993). Evidence suggests that A De-

fence and True Declarationwas written by Marnix van St. Aldegonde, a confidant of William of Orange. See Martin Van Gelderen, Introduction to THE DUTCH REVOLT, supra,

at xv.
11. See FRANK TALLETT, WAR AND SOCIETY IN EARLY-MODERN EUROPE, 1495-

1715, at 18-19 (1992)
12. GIOVANNI BOTERO, THE CAVSE OF THE GREATNESSE OF CITIES 1-2 (T.
H[awkins] trans., London 1635).

13. See generally Bernard S. Bachrach, On Roman Ramparts, in THE CAMBRIDGE
ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF WARFARE 64, 64-91 (Geoffrey Parker ed., 1995). "From the

reign of the emperor Diocletian (AD 285-305) until the development of firearms in the
fourteenth century, the essentials of military organization, strategy, and tactics in Europe
display a startling continuity." Id. at 64.
14. See FRIEDRICHS, supra note 6, at 293.
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ten impossible." Although artillery had simultaneously improved,
these great engineering feats converted major cities into nearly
impenetrable fortresses.
The rapid improvements in city fortification transformed armies
and, as a result, catalyzed the centralization of political power over

vast territories. The near impregnability of Italian-style fortifications required encirclement and protracted siege of cities to starve
them into submission. 16 The Spanish siege of one Dutch seaport,
for example, lasted over three years (1601-1604)." Such methods,
of course, required large numbers of troops. The resulting en-

largement of armies in turn entailed massive efforts to keep them
fed, requiring greater attention to protecting supply lines. Each
enemy city had to be conquered, one at a time, and then garri-

soned with loyal troops to prevent repossession by the enemy.
Only empires large and wealthy enough to take advantage of
economies of scale could hope to compete effectively in this stra18
tegic environment.

These enormous military requirements, along with the necessary
taxation to support them, helped cause cities to fall increasingly

under the political fold of states.' 9 As noted above, cities had long
represented individual political entities within larger imperial
ones, though many of the city's privileges vis A vis the state were

15. See DUFFY, supra note 7, at 23-42; GEOFFREY PARKER, THE MILITARY
REVOLUTION 7-13 (1988).
16. See TALLET, supra note 11, at 50-53.
17. See DUFFY,supra note 7, at 85-89.
18. See generally Bean, supra note 2, at 203-21 (arguing that changes in military technology during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries advantaged centralized states over decentralized ones); see also LEWIS MUMFORD, THE CITY IN HISTORY 360-63 (1961)
(describing transformations in warfare and their effects on city government). "The need
for more costly sinews of war put the cities into the hands of usurious oligarchies that financed the ruler's mischievous policies, lived sumptuously on the profits and loot, and
sought to entrench their positions by backing the ensuing despotism." Id. at 361. This
relationship between military technology and political organization is all the more significant insofar as one might expect rapid development of local fortifications to correlate with
declines in central authority. In his History of Warfare, John Keegan argues that strongholds, or fortified sanctuaries, "are a product of small or divided sovereignties; they proliferate when central authority has not been established or is struggling to secure itself or has
broken down." JOHN KEEGAN, A HISTORY OF WARFARE 142 (1993).
19. See Bean, supra note 2, at 203-21. The thesis that the requirements of warfare resulted in greater political centralization is discussed in THEODORE K. RABB, THE
STRUGGLE FOR STABILITY IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 71 (1975); and TALLET, supra
note 11, at 188 (noting that warfare "was a crucial - probably indeed the crucial - agent
of change in the development of the state .... ."). But see RABB, supra,at 97-98 (arguing
that economic necessity drove centralization).
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based on assurances that the city would provide revenue.20 Only
cities guaranteed control over their surrounding territory and only
cities could generate the financial sustenance of warring states;
"[G]rowing bureaucracies made capitals and towns the administrative centers of royal absolutism."'" Siege warfare naturally became the dominant mode of conflict. Pitched battles were rare; instead, state armies targeted cities.'
The massive stone fortifications ringing sixteenth century cities
symbolized the early modem European political order. While imperial rulers expended vast sums to outfit key cities with state of
the art fortifications, these very fortifications served as reminders
that cities themselves remained self-contained units within states,
financially and militarily valuable, but not yet constitutive of nations.
B.

The Laws of Siege Warfare

Given the pivotal role that cities played in early modern European strategy-the "pattern of siege, relief (most sieges failed with
or without a relief force), and either a battle or more likely a
phased withdrawal by the besieging force, dominated western warfare for a thousand years"4-it is not surprising that a wellentrenched legal regime developed to regulate siege warfare. A
rigid set of customs directed how a fortified city was to be attacked, how it might respond, and what it might expect if captured.24
Like those of the preceding medieval period, early modern customary rules involved varying degrees of immunity depending on
the timing of capitulations. That is, the quicker a city's population
or garrison capitulated to a besieging army, the greater immunity
from pillage it received.2 This tradeoff was usually governed by
mechanical rules-strict customary codes marked the precise time
at which surrender could be offered and accepted. Specifically,
protocol demanded that an advancing army send to the town a
20. See FRIEDRICHS, supra note 6, at 54.
21. PAUL M. HOHENBERG & LYNN HOLLEN LEES, THE MAKING OF URBAN EUROPE
1000-1950, at 137 (1985).
22. See PARKER, supra note 15, at 16.
23. Bachrach, supranote 13, at 64-65.
24. For a discussion of sixteenth century laws of war and their relationship to military
strategy, as well as some first-hand accounts of Philip II's views on them, see generally
Matthew C. Waxman, StrategicTerror: Philip H and Sixteenth-Century Warfare, 4 WAR IN
HIST. 339, 339-47 (1997).

25. See

FRIEDRICHS,

supra note 6, at 294.
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summons to surrender. The defending town was then allowed to
submit with complete immunity for its garrison and civilian population up until the moment at which the formal siege commenced,
generally signified by the firing of a cannon.' If a town refused
this initial summons to surrender, no future mercy was guaranteed. 27
The forfeit of this immunity privilege did not, however, always
condemn a defending city to slaughter. Though the defending garrison generally submitted to the mercy (or lack of it) of the attacking force, agreements were often negotiated between attacking and defending forces that allowed for the peaceful transfer of
authority over the town.28 For example, Velazquez' famous
painting of The Surrender of Breda, at which the Dutch turned
over the city to Spanish forces in 1625, depicts the opposing commanders kneeling to each other, With the vanquished Justinus of
Nassau ceremoniously handing over the key to the city gates39
The customary pageantries that accompanied surrender of cities
and towns reflected the political stakes involved. For a surrendering city was not merely admitting an invading force; it was ratifying a transfer of sovereign authority. 3° As one modern scholar
put it: "today's enemy was tomorrow's overlord. The veil of social
cohesion which but thinly masked the competing interests of different groups in every community was all too quickly shredded as
ultimate
loyalties were tested by the demands of military occupa31
tion."
26. See JIM BRADBURY, THE MEDIEVAL SIEGE
WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 120 (1965).

308-17 (1992); M.H. KEEN, LAW OF

27. See PARKER, supra note 10, at 159-60; Geoffrey Parker, Early Modern Europe, in
THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 40, 48
(Michael Howard et al. eds., 1994).

28. For a description of the similar customs regulating surrender of cities in the seventeenth century, see John W. Wright, Sieges and Customs of War at the Opening of the
Eighteenth Century, 39 AM. HIST. REV. 629,631-35 (1934).
29.

See JOSE LOPEz-REY,

VELAZQUEZ' WORK AND WORLD

75-76 (1968).

30. A wonderful example of such authority transfer is the experience of the small German city of N6rdlingen. At the start of the Thirty Years' War, imperial forces garrisoned
the city. In 1632, Swedish forces under Gustavus Adolphus captured and garrisoned it

themselves. Imperial troops then laid siege to the city in 1634, and it was forced to open
its gates to the victorious imperial army. French forces received the city's surrender in
1645, only to yield it to Bavarian occupation. The city underwent yet another reversal of
control in 1646, when a Swedish garrison was once again emplaced (and remained there
until then end of the war and the signing of the Peace of Westphalia). See CHRISTOPHER
R. FRIEDRICHS, URBAN SOCIETY IN AN AGE OF WAR: NORDLINGEN,

31 (1979).
31.

FRIEDRICHS, supra note 6,

at 300.

1580-1720. at 28-
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But, while peaceful transfers of cities through surrender were
common, so too were bloody ones. As will be seen below, garrisons were frequently put to the sword as warnings to other obdurate towns. Despite their commitment to humane standards of
conduct in warfare, contemporary Spanish theologians like Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suarez recognized the sometimes
justifiable demonstrative effects of sacking unyielding towns or
executing their garrisons.32 This practice of exemplary sacking can
be found throughout military history of the period, including
Count Tilly's brutal destruction of Magdeburg (1631) during the
Thirty Years' War3 3 and Oliver Cromwell's devastation of Drogheda (1649) during the English Civil War.Yn
The very worst treatment was reserved for those towns that,
failing to grant entry at all, were successfully assaulted.3 5 A passage from Shakespeare's Henry V, though incorporating poetic license, illustrates the prevailing expectations among towns that,
when summoned, refused entry to an invading force:
... [Y]ou men of Harflew,
Take pity of your town and of your people
Whiles yet my soldiers are in my command,
Whiles yet the cool and temperate wind of grace
O'erblows the filthy and contagious clouds
Of heady murther, spoil, and villainy.
If not-why, in a moment look to see
The blind and bloody soldier with foul hand
Defile the locks of your shrill-shrieking daughters,
Your fathers taken by the silver beards
And their most reverend heads dash'd to the walls,
Your naked infants spitted upon pikes
Whiles the mad mothers with their howls confus'd
32. See FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, POLITICAL WRITINGS, 319-21 (Anthony Pagden &
Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991); FRANCISCO SUAREZ, 2 SELEUrIONS FROM THREE WORKS
847 (Gwladys L. Williams et al. trans., 1944). This Part draws heavily on sixteenth century
Spanish writings, as it is "an incontrovertible fact that nearly all the first works dealing
(jointly) with humanitarian law and international law were written by Spanish authors...
." Sergio Moratiel Villa, The Spanish School of the New Law of Nations, 1992 INT'L REV.
RED CROSS 416,417.
33. See Parker, supra note 27, at 50.
34. See James Burke, The New Model Army and the Problems of Siege Warfare, 1648.
51, 27 IRISH HIST. STUD. 1, 8-15 (1990). "The deterrent value of Drogheda certainly hastened the surrender of a number of small garrisons at Dundalk, Trim, Carlingford and
Newry." Id. at 14. See also Parker, supranote 27, at 50.
35. See PERCY BORDWELL, THE LAW OF WAR BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS 22 (1908);

BRADBURY, supra note 26, at 317-24.
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Do break the clouds, as did the wives of Jewry
At Herod's bloody-hunting slaughtermen.
What say you? Will you yield, and this avoid,
Or, guilty in defense, be thus destroy'd?
Of particular significance is the notion that damage sustained to
civilians was deemed the responsibility of the defender. The allocation of responsibility echoed in Cromwell's warning, after his
brutal sacking of Drogheda, to defenders of the nearby fortress
town of Wexford:
Having brought the army belonging to the Parliament of
England before this place, to reduce it to its due obedience, to the end effusion of blood may be prevented and
the town and country about it preserved from ruin, I
thought fit to summon you to deliver the same to me, to
the use of the State of England.
By this offer, I hope it will clearly appear where the guilt
will lie, if innocent persons should come to suffer with the
nocent. 37
In shifting responsibility to the defender, the harm befalling
noncombatants as a result of a siege-starvation, bombardment,
sack-was understood as incidental effects of warfare. According
to Vitoria:
[I]t is occasionally lawful to kill the innocent not by mistake, but with full knowledge of what one is doing, if this
is an accidental effect: for example, during the justified
storming of a fortress or city, where one knows there are
many innocent people, but where it is impossible to fire
artillery and other projectiles or set fire to buildings
without crushing or burning the innocent along with the
combatants. 38
Similarly, Suarez pronounced that while "innocent persons as
such may in nowise be slain, ... incidentally they may be slain,

when such an act is necessary in order to secure victory. ' 39 This is
36. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V, act 3, sc. 3, quoted in Theodor Meron. Shakespeare's Henry the Fifth and the Law of War, 86 AM. J. INT'L L 1,21, n.110 (1992).
37. Summons from Oliver Cromwell for the Commander-in-Chief of Wexford (Oct. 3,
1649) in 2 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF OLIVER CROMWELL 135 (Wilbur Cortez
Abbott ed., 1939).
38. VrroRIA, supra note 32, at 315 (emphasis omitted).
39. SUAREZ, supra note 32, at 845.
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because in seeking victory, "the victor does not really kill, for he is
not the cause of the death in an essential, but merely in an incidental sense." 4 Balthazar de Ayala, a Spanish army judge advocate,
further explained that "such things are inevitable in war" and
therefore not unlawful.4 This principle of siege warfare, that the
defender bears the risks of incidental harm to its civilian population, reemerges time and again in the laws governing the attack of
cities.
Both the methods of siege warfare and the customary law regulating it stemmed from the political relationship of cities to states.
Since state authority lay atop individual pillars of city-level
authority, all that was necessary to transfer the nominal allegiance
of a city was to overthrow or force to capitulate its garrison and
reinstall one's own along with loyal magistrates. 42 Though often
condoning brutality, sixteenth century laws of war afforded defending cities a fleeting opportunity to secure mercy. This regime
created enormous incentives for cities to surrender quickly. It was
these incentives that the Duke of Alva attempted to exploit in his
campaign to subdue the Netherlands.
C.

The Duke of Alva and the Dutch Revolt: The Convergence of
Law and Strategy

The revolt of the Low Countries (roughly, modern Belgium and
the Netherlands) against King Philip II and his Habsburg rule ignited in 1566. Initially sparked by several hundred noblemen opposed to the Spanish Inquisition, iconoclastic rioting soon burgeoned into a full-blown rebellion.43 Not until eighty years later
was the conflict finally resolved, with the northern, Dutch portion
gaining independence from Spanish rule.
In 1567 Philip II dispatched the Duke of Alva and a sizable
force to quell the rebellion.' The approach of his army, along
with his "Council of Blood," which sentenced thousands of rebels
to death and confiscated wealthy estates, was often enough to

40. Id. at 849.
41. BALTHAZAR AYALA, 2 DE JURE ET OFFICIIS BELLICIS ET DISCIPLINA MILITARI

LIBRI III 33 (John Westlake ed. & John Pawley Bate trans., Carnegie Institution 1912)
(1582).

42. For examples of such transfer in the Netherlands, see PARKER, supra note 10, at
146-47.
43. See id. at 68-84.
44. See id. at 84-88.
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frighten pockets of resistance into submission. 45 He then went on
to defeat a French- and German-supported invasion attempt led
by William of Nassau, Prince of Orange.'
Despite these initial successes, in 1572 the rebels captured by
surprise much of Holland and Zealand, two northern provinces
that included a number of cities protected by Italian-style fortifications. The need to recapture and garrison these towns placed Alva
in a quandary: the war was draining Spanish resources (already diverted to battling the Turks in the Mediterranean) so a quick victory was vital, but the defensive position of the rebels made a
rapid reconquest almost impossible.47
To escape this quandary, Alva turned to a strategy of terror, the
application of brutal violence against a portion of enemy territory
in hope of inducing surrender of the rest. As Alva himself would
later plead, following the sacking of one rebellious town, "God
grant that the rest may learn from it and that it will not be necessary to carry With them to the end and go from town to town with
the army of your Majesty."' Such a strategy required two elements, a threat of violence and incentives to surrender. Because
cities controlled territory, they would naturally become Alva's
primary object.4 9
To create the necessary threat of terror, Alva's army needed not
only an ability to raise the perceived costs of resistance but also
the means to transmit that threat in a credible way to other towns.
This was a relatively easy task, since Alva's reputation for cruelty
quickly circulated throughout Dutch territory following his exemplary sacking of towns.50 The more difficult requirement of Alva's
strategic terror design was to convey to other towns a credible inducement to surrender. Once the penalties of resistance were
made evident, Alva had to offer them some means of avoiding
those costs. The key dilemma arising out of Alva's strategy
stemmed from an inherent tension between these two elements.
45. See 2JOHN LOTHROP MOTLEY, THE RISE OFTHE DUTcH REPUBLIC 126-47 (New
York, Harper & Bros. 1862); PARKER, supra note 10,at 106-08.
46. See WILLIAM S. MALTBY, ALBA: A BIOGRAPHY OF FERNANDO ALVAREZ DE
TOLEDO, THIRD DUKE OF ALBA 1507-1582, at 159-81 (1983).

47. See PARKER, supranote 10, at 126-140.
48. Letter from Alva to Philip II, quoted in MALTBY, supra note 46, at 244.
49. During this period, a relatively large proportion of the Netherland population lived
in towns. Around 1550, nineteen Netherland towns housed more than 10,000 residents,
compared with only four such towns in the entire British Isles. See PARKER, supra note
10, at 23.
50. See WILLIAM S. MALTBY, THE BLACK LEGEND INENGLAND 49-50 (1971).
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The more brutally an army demonstrated its penchant for slaughter and blood-thirstiness, the less likely the defending towns might
be to believe promises of immunity.
Sixteenth century laws of siege warfare helped solve this dilemma. The customary regime was structured to convey a high
price of resistance and an immunity privilege for immediate surrender. In theory, making war more brutal would ultimately result
in less brutality; the sack of one town would result in immediate
surrender, and therefore the sparing, of other towns. The more
terrible siege warfare was, the less often individual sieges would
need occur. 1
The Duke of Alva's initial success with his strategy of terror
bears out the paradoxical yet efficient nature of these rules.
Mechelen, the first town sacked in the 1572 campaign, was ravaged
after refusing unconditional surrender to Alva's forces. z As one
eyewitness recalled, "the soldiers behaved as if this religious capital of the country were a Muslim city and all the inhabitants barbarians. The desolation was so complete that not a nail was left in
a wall."53 Such atrocities, however, prompted the immediate surrender of a handful of nearby towns fearing similar vengeance and
bloodshed. Alva welcomed this speedy progress and graciously
accepted their surrender. 4 Several months later, the pattern was
repeated: the terrible sack of Zutphen 55 sped the quick surrender
of its neighboring towns.56 City after city sought to avoid the rape,
killing, and arson that had accompanied the sack of brethren cities
by taking advantage of the waivable protection afforded them by
legal custom.
Just as his adherence to the legal regime supported Alva's rapid
advance, his later disregard for customary rules led to its disintegration. The unraveling of his campaign began with the sack of
Naarden towards the end of 1572. Although accounts differ, it ap51. This helps explain why theologians like Vitoria, though seeking to ensure standards
of humane conduct in warfare, nevertheless saw certain sackings as justified for deterrence
purposes. See VITORIA, supra note 32, at 320 n.45, 323.
52. See 2 MOTLEY, supra note 45, at 407; Parker, supra note 27, at 49.
53. Parker, supra note 27, at 49.
54. See PIETER GEYL, THE REVOLT OF THE NETHERLANDS 119 (1958); MALTBY, su-

pra note 46, at 240 ("There could be no doubt that his policy was working. Louvain and
Termonde had surrendered on merely hearing of his threats against Mechelen, and when
the news of his terrible vengeance spread beyond the confines of Brabant other towns
followed suit."); PARKER, supra note 10, at 141-42.
55. See 2 MOTLEY, supra note 45, at 417.
56. See PARKER, supra note 10, at 141-42.
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pears that after the town surrendered in return for guarantees of
protection, Spanish forces turned around and sacked it anyway.Y
In early 1573, the obdurate town of Haarlem was similarly given
an opportunity to surrender and avoid a sack. Otherwise, royal
forces threatened to burn it to the ground.2 Opting to submit,
Haarlem opened its gates to Alva's forces, whereupon more than
2,000 soldiers and magistrates were coldly executed for their treasonous conduct.5 9 Apparently, Alva's impatience with the slowing
progress of his campaign, combined with increasingly vocal dissent
within the Spanish court, had overwhelmed any inclination for
moderation that Alva may have had6
Intended to induce the surrender of neighboring towns, Alva's
overeager displays at Naarden and Haarlem had the opposite effect: they stiffened the resolve of towns still in rebellion. As Cardinal Granville described, "The Duke of Alva now complains that
other areas have not surrendered spontaneously, but he should
remember that there are soldiers defending the [other] towns who,
fearingthe same treatment
as the garrisonof Haarlem, will fight un6
til they die of hunger."1'
The erosion of Alva's strategy became evident during the siege
of Alkmaar, in late 1573. Having heard of the atrocities at Haarlem, the rebel troops at Alkmaar refused to surrender, despite
being heavily out-numbered and out-armed. This came at a particularly difficult time for Spain, which was financially drained and
thus unable to pay its own troops in the Netherlands. Royal
troops refused their orders to assault the town, forcing the lifting
of Alkmaar's siege in October 1573.62 The Spanish winning streak
was snapped.
Alva had failed to appreciate the convergence of strategic efficiency with the laws of war. "Until [Naarden], terror had been
successful because it appeared discriminate-towns that submitted, albeit from a distance, were not sacked."' He cast off restraints on his forces' behavior without realizing that the legal regime, with its embedded incentives for quick surrender, would

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See MALTBY, supra note 46, at 243-44.
See PARKER, supra note 10, at 159
See DUFFY, supra note 7, at 71-72; 2 MOTLEY, supra note 45, at 454-55.
See MALTBY, supra note 46, at 252-54.
Cardinal Granville, quoted in PARKER, supra note 10, at 160 (emphasis added).
See PARKER, supra note 10, at 162.
MATLBY, supra note 46, at 243.
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have facilitated, rather than constrained, his strategy of terror. As
Grotius observed in his narrative of the events:
The Spaniards were wont, ... believing these Crueltes
were convenient for the accelerating and speeding their
victory; when, on the contrary, Experience affirms, that
men are overcome by no means so soon as Clemency,
when the other doth rather heighten mens spleen and
courage, when all trust and hope of Pardon being taken
away, they fear the Mischeifs of Peace greater and heavier then those of Warre ....
64
The initial success and ultimate failure of Alva's campaign also
illustrates the role that cities themselves played as a medium
through which the threat of terror traveled. Reports flowing from
neighboring towns of discriminate violence fostered submission;
tales of wanton barbarism, though, spread faster than advancing
armies and hardened resistance as they perfused. Half a century
later, during the Thirty Years' War, horrors of the sack of Magdeburg (which had destroyed almost the entire city and killed thousands of inhabitants) similarly spread quickly; nearly 300 printed
pamphlets, in various languages, appeared throughout the continent. 65 Like the early sackings of Alva's 1572 campaign, Magdeburg's fate reinforced the sixteenth century legal order of siege
warfare. Magdeburg had initially rejected demands for surrender.
As a result, "[t]housands perished but, contrary to the assertions
acof Protestant polemicists, not through sectarian passion but
66
cording to the laws of war reinforced by strategic necessity.

III. CITIES AS NATIONHOOD: SHERMAN'S MARCH THROUGH THE
CONFEDERATE SOUTH

A. Cities and the Nationalizationof Warfare
Alva's mode of warfare, the strategic use of terror, required adherence to an entrenched set of rules governing surrender of cities.
His deviance from these rules eroded the very expectations so vital
to his design's success. General Sherman's march through the
64. HUGO GROTIUS, DE REBUS BELGICIS: OR, THE ANNALS, AND HISTORY OF THE

Low-COUNTREY-WARRS 65 (Thomas Manley trans., London, 1665).
65. See FRIEDRICHS, supra note 6, at 296.
66. PARKER, supra note 27, at 50.
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Confederate South (1864-65),67 illustrates a different relationship
among cities, strategy, and the laws of war. Sherman, too, sought
to subdue a vast region, in large part through the spreading of terror. Like Alva, Sherman used cities as a medium through which
he transmitted this terror. Unlike his predecessor, however,
Sherman's particular method of doing so required his consciously
holding the laws of war in abeyance.
Much like Philip I three centuries earlier, President Lincoln
and his generals faced the challenge of defeating a well-armed rebellion in possession of immense territory."S The nature of warfare, however, was entirely novel, reflecting in many ways the
evolving role of cities within the state and hence within military
conflict. Two attributes of modem warfare-the reliance on industrial capacity and the need to mobilize and sustain popular
will-would profoundly affect the way military commanders
viewed cities as objects of war.
The Civil War was in many ways a battle of resources. Armies
of several hundred thousand soldiers and their accompanying artillery required mobilization of entire nations as war economies.6 9
In this respect the North held a distinct advantage, as the northern
states possessed ninety percent of American pre-war industry. 0
Nevertheless, during the course of the war the Confederacy transformed itself from an agrarian to an emerging industrial economy
to supply one of the world's largest armies of its time.7 '
As one Confederate general described, war had become one "in
which the whole population and whole production of a country ...
are to be put on a war footing, where every institution is to be
67. See generally John Bennett Waiters, General William T. Sherman and Total War, 14
J.S. HIsT. 447 (1948) (describing Sherman's Civil War campaigns and theory of warfare).
For personal narratives of the campaign, see HENRY HITCHCOCK, MARCHING WITH
SHERMAN (M.A. DeWolfe Howe ed., Yale Univ. Press 1927) (1864-65); and WILLIAM T.
SHERMAN, MEMOIRS OF GENERAL WILLIAM T. SHERMAN (new ed., Indiana Univ. Press
1957).
68. See Williamson Murray, What Took the North So Long?, in EXPERIENCE OF WAR
179-81 (Robert Cowley ed., 1992).
69. See MICHAEL HOWARD, THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR 3-4 (1961); ALLAN R.
MILLErT & PETER MASLOWSKI, FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE 163-65 (rev. & expanded
ed. 1994).
70. Peter Maslowski, To the Edge of Greatness: The United States, 1783-1865, in THE
MAKING OF STRATEGY 205,235 (Williamson Murray et al. eds., 1994).
71. See RICHARD E. BERINGER ET AL, WHY THE SOUTH LOST THE CIVIL WAR 59
(1986). The pre-war modernization of the Southern economy should not be overstated.
Despite the fact that the slave economy had modem, capitalist, and even industrial aspects, Southerners in general were hesitant to celebrate these features until after the war.
See generallyC. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OFTHE NEW SOUTH 1877-1913 (1971).
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made auxiliary to war, where every citizen and every industry is to
have for the time but the one attribute-that of contributing to the
public defense. '72 The strangulation of individual towns so prominent in early modem Europe was thus replaced by a grand Union
blockade of the entire Confederate South. 73 The changing nature
of warfare in turn placed enormous burdens on cities.
While cities had long been vital to the economic and financial
viability of the state and its war efforts, their contribution had previously been additive; the strength of the state equaled the sum of
its parts. The interconnectedness and interdependence of the
nineteenth century modernizing economy, however, meant that
the value of a city could not simply be subtracted without causing
adverse and possibly crippling consequences throughout the country.74 "[T]he railroad helped to transform local economies into a
regional and eventually a national economy,"'7 5 and Southern railroad mileage had quadrupled between 1850 and 1860.76
Whereas the state previously levied taxes, food, and conscripts
from populous fortress towns, the state now depended on cities
not only individually but as a larger network of interdependent
manufacturing centers. To advocates of Southern urbanization,
cities represented more than just isolated pockets of economic
modernization. They would bind and propel the entire South into
nationhood. As Southern nationalist J.D.B. DeBow declared in
1860: "Once Baltimore, Richmond, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile,
and New Orleans will supply all goods foreign and domestic, how
easily we might cut off all dependence on the North." 77
The Civil War was also a battle of national will, the burden of
which again fell heavily on cities. To sustain armies of new magnitude over the course of several years, in the face of nation-wide
privations, required that national leaders maintain popular morale.
The "nation at arms" model of warfare unleashed by the French
72. MILLETT & MASLOWSKI, supra note 69, at 163.
73. See id. at 170-71.
74. A map of major Confederate railway lines reveals that cities such as Jackson, Mississippi and Atlanta, Georgia were major transportation hubs, explaining the great attention given them as targets during Sherman's campaigns. See id. at 180. The same was true
of Mississippi River ports, which were often the sites of major Civil War battles.
75. David Goldfield, Urban Growth in the South, in AMERICAN URBAN HISTORY 82,
85 (Alexander B. Callow, Jr. ed., 3d ed. 1982).
76. See id. at 84.
77. J.D.B. DeBow, quoted in LAWRENCE H. LARSEN, THE RISE OF THE URBAN

SOUTH 9 (1985). These views were shared by other prominent antebellum writers such as
George Fitzhugh. See Goldfield, supra note 75, at 84.
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Revolution and rise of Napoleon in Europe demanded mobilization of an entire population behind a popular cause. 8 Following
the European example, both the North and South introduced
forms of a draft in 1862. 79 Initially the mobilization of national will
seemed to favor the South, as rising sectionalism, revolutionary
fervor, and identity as a nation distinct from the Union generated
determination and commitment to a common cause.10 Indeed,
some historians have posited that the emergence of cities themselves proved a nationalizing force by muting the regional differences previously dominant in the Southern states.81
As loci of large proportions of regional population, cities possessed political influence far greater than their small number
would suggest.82 In addition, however, the interconnectedness of
cities as parts of nations, with a shared sense of political and cultural identity, meant that cities could not be considered in isolation, but rather formed part of a larger fabric. As General Sherman himself would declare, "When one nation is at war with
another, all the people of the one are enemies of the other ....83
Although the countryside, too, would face Sherman's wrath, cities
stood as emblems of sovereignty. To increasing numbers of
Southerners, cities stood for independence and progress. 84
The changed political and strategic significance of the city was
reflected symbolically in the webs of railways running to, from,
and between cities, instead of the walled fortifications of sixteenth
century Europe ensuring their isolation. With an integrated national war effort, the entire South would be converted into a besieged city, with the nation as a whole prepared for onslaught.
"[T]he distinction between army and nation was dissolved.... The
nation at war thus became an armed camp-sometimes a besieged
fortress-in which every individual felt himself involved in a
mighty communal endeavour."

78. See J.F.C. FULLER, THE CONDUCT OF WAR 1789-1961, at 33-37 (1961).
79. See MILLET & MASLOWSKI, supra note 69, at 205-10
80. See id.
at 168. But see BERINGERETAL, supra note 71, at 64-81 (arguing that "lack

of will constituted the decisive deficiency in the Confederate arsenal").
81. See DAVID R.GOLDFIELD, URBAN GRONVrH INTHE AGE OF SECTONAUSM xxii
(1977).
82. See idat xviii.
83. Sherman, quoted in Walters, supra note 67, at 459.
84. See CHARLES N. GLAAB & A. THEODORE BROWN, A HISTORY OF URBAN
AMERICA 53-63 (1967); see also supra note 77 and accompanying text.
85. HOWARD, supra note 69, at 3.
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The notion of a nation-wide, as opposed to city-by-city, siege
would permeate the minds of military planners throughout the
war, with enormous impact on their views of laws of warfare. As
the British military theorist J.F.C. Fuller described, "For the nineteenth century this was a new conception, because it meant that
the deciding factor in war-the power to sue for peace-was transferred from government to people, and that peace-making was a
product of revolution. This was to carry the principle of democracy to its ultimate stage ....
,86 This devolution of political control, particularly regarding the decision to surrender, reverberated
in changing understandings of the laws of war.
B.

The Lieber Code and Nineteenth Century Customs of War

While the nature of warfare evolved rapidly during the nineteenth century, the laws of war remained largely inherited from
previous eras. As Sherman's campaigns will illustrate, the legal
regime in place at the outset of the Civil War proved ill suited for
emerging strategic theory, particularly with regard to destruction
and surrender of cities.
The Union Army, as well as its Confederate counterpart, drew
upon two sources of legal authority: the first military legal manual,
referred to since as the Lieber Code, 87 and customary rules as
practiced in Europe. The Lieber Code, a document of 157 articles
named after its drafter, Francis Lieber, was promulgated as the
Union Army's General Orders, No. 100: Instructionsfor the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, and spelled out
limits on the methods of warfare. 88
In drafting this code, Lieber attempted to balance military necessities of modern warfare with customary protections afforded
civilians and the cities in which they dwelled.89 On the one hand,
Lieber recognized that the emergence of the modern nation-state
had partially blurred the distinction between combatant and noncombatant:
It is a law and requisite of civilized existence that men
live in political, continuous societies, forming organized
86. FULLER, supra note 78, at 108.

87. General Orders, No. 100, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field, April 24, 1863 [hereinafter Lieber Code], reprinted in RICHARD
SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 45-71 (1983).
88. See Hartigan, supra note 87, at 5-23.
89. See id. at 15-16.
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units, called states or nations, whose constituents bear,
enjoy, and suffer, advance and retrograde together, in
peace and in war.... The citizen or native of a hostile
country is thus an enemy, as one of the constituents of
the hostile state or nation, and as such is subjected to the
hardships of the war.90
At the same time, however, this notion of a seamlessness and unity
of effort among the citizenry and military agents of the state was
tempered by customary practice, which recognized a distinction
between the two classes:
"Nevertheless, as civilization has
advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise steadily
advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the
private individual belonging to a hostile country and the hostile
country itself, with its men in arms.""
Lieber attempted to reconcile these apparently conflicting views
by elaborating the concept of "military necessity." He thus declared, "[m]ilitary necessity, as understood by modem civilized nations, consists in the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawfid
92
accordingto the modern law and usages of war."
Herein lay the trouble. The definition of what constitutes
"military necessity" or "indispensability" is inherently ambiguous.
Its uncertainty, however, had been further clouded by the changing nature of warfare itself. The French Revolution inaugurated
the model of entire nations springing to arms--"total industrial
and civilian mobilization." 93 Note, though, that Lieber viewed
military necessity narrowly, as a positive restraint on military
methods. That is, if a rule was clear and did not specifically provide for exceptions, then it had to be obeyed; the only legitimate
grounds of military necessity were those defined in the laws of war
themselves.94
Lieber's narrow, positive conception of military necessity resounds in his interpretation of rules governing bombardment of
cities:
90. Lieber Code, supra note 87, at arts. 20-21.
91. Lieber Code, supra note 87, at art, 22.
92. Lieber Code, supra note 87, at art. 14 (emphasis added).

93. See William V. O'Brien, The Meaning of 'Military Necessity' in InternationalLaw, 1
WORLD POLITY 109,132-33 (1957).
94. See id.at 129.
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Commanders, whenever admissible, inform the enemy of
their intention to bombard a place, so that the noncombatants, and especially the women and children, may
be removed before the bombardment commences. But it
is no infraction of the common law of war to omit thus to
inform the enemy. Surprise may be a necessity. 95
Lieber hereby envisioned an exception only in cases of
bombardment preceding an assault, where protection of one's own
troops and the tactical advantage of shock made notification
96
impracticable.
These limits on unannounced bombardment of cities flowed not
only from the protections generally afforded unarmed civilians but
also from the notion that enemy property ought only to be destroyed if necessary: "The principle has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person,
property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit." 97
To understand where Lieber would draw the nineteenth century
lines of necessity requires examination of the contemporary norms
from which he derived his Code.
The specific regulations of the Lieber Code were refinements of
European customary practice, described in two of the most widely
cited treatises of contemporary norms, those of Vatte 98 and
Halleck. 99 Vattel, writing in the latter half of the eighteenth century, remarked that destruction of cities and towns by bombardment:
is an extremity to which we do not proceed without cogent reasons. But it is nevertheless warranted by the
laws of war, when we are unable by any other mode to
reduce an important post, on which the success of the
95. Lieber Code, supra note 87, at art. 19.
96. Cf. Thomas G. Robisch, General William T. Sherman: Would the Georgia Campaigns of the First Commander of the Modern Era Comply with Current Law of War Standards?, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 459, 477-78 (1995) (arguing that Sherman's unannounced
bombardment would have fallen within the Lieber Code's provisions only if Sherman had
planned an imminent assault on Atlanta); J.M. SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 171
(1911) (arguing that Sherman's bombardment of Atlanta ran contrary to the Lieber code).
97. Lieber Code, supra note 87, at art. 22.
98. See E. VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (Joseph Chitty trans., 1867) (1758).
99. See H. W. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW; OR, RULES REGULATING THE
INTERCOURSE OF STATES IN PEACE AND WAR (1861). Although Halleck was American,

his treatise was based largely on European practice.
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war may depend, or which enables the enemy to annoy
us in a dangerous manner."°
Relying heavily on the work of Vattel, Henry Halleck, an international legal scholar and the General-in-Chief of the Union Armies at the outbreak of the Civil War,10 ' similarly invoked limits of
"necessity" on the destruction of enemy cities:
[T]he sacking of towns and villages, and delivering them
up to a prey to fire and the sword, are terrible remedies,
which are often worse than the evil to be removed ....
The general rule by which we should regulate our conduct toward an enemy, is that of moderation, and on no
occasion should we unnecessarily destroy his property.'02
Like Vattel, Halleck proposed overarching standards to regulate
destruction, though where he would draw precise lines of
impermissability remained unclear.
These treatises left open the question of what constituted sufficient necessity to destroy a city, especially one that had already
surrendered or was undefended. In sixteenth century Europe, official surrender (literally, the handing over of keys to the gates)
marked a bright line dividing justified destruction and immunity
from pillage. This regime flowed naturally from military strategy
that focused on the capture of one city at a time; each city, as a
quasi-autonomous political unit, controlled its own destiny. In
that era, the opening of a town's gates was generally sufficient to
satisfy the aims of conquering armies.
The sixteenth century logic of siege warfare and its customary
regime of surrender would be turned on its head, however, by the
onset of national warfare. The city now formed a part of a larger
whole; the legal norms codified by Lieber did not contemplate the
sort of warfare that Sherman envisioned and practiced. a3

100.
101.
102.
103.

VATrEL, supra note 98, at 367-68.
See HARTIGAN, supranote 87, at 2.
HALLECK, supra note 99, at 465-66.
See Robisch, supra note 96, at 461.
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C. Sherman's March and the Inversion of Sixteenth Century
SurrenderLogic
Upon his rise to supreme commander of U.S. forces, 1°4 General
Ulysses S. Grant resolved to send army-sized raids deep into
Southern territory to devastate the Confederacy's logistical base.
Moving rapidly and living off the land through which these armies
passed would obviate the need to garrison conquered territory.1 5
This strategy of economic destruction was embodied in Sherman's attack on Atlanta and his subsequent "March to the Sea"
and campaign through the Carolinas. 106 From March 1864 until
the conclusion of the war, Major General William T. Sherman
served as commander of the Federal Division of the Mississippi. l°7
In accordance with Grant's strategic vision, Sherman advanced
through Georgia to Atlanta, the major Confederate railway hub
and manufacturing center of the southeast region.10 8 In addition to
Grant's vision of knocking out the enemy's ability to supply its
forces, Sherman's campaign incorporated a significant psychological component, for which Sherman acquired his reputation for
genius and brutality.0 9 In wrecking the Confederacy's economic
base, Sherman's methods also sowed terror among the Southern
populace to erode Southern morale and support for the war.
After demolishing the capital of Mississippi," 0 Sherman and his
army of 60,000 troops advanced onto Atlanta. It was there that
Sherman committed his most notorious acts: the bombardment of
the city without warning' and his subsequent order to evacuate

104. See MILLETT & MASLOWSKI, supra note 69, at 229-30.
105. See Maslowski, supra note 70, at 238-39.
106. See Robisch, supranote 96, at 461.
107. See 1 SHERMAN, supra note 67, at 401.
108. Both the North and the South relied heavily on improved communication and
transportation systems to produce and move the industrial resources so necessary to modem armies. See BERINGER ET AL., supra note 71, at 105. Military planners therefore
viewed cities like Atlanta, both a manufacturing center as well as a major railway hub, as
vital to the logistical viability of the South's national war effort. See Robisch, supra note
96, at 461.
109. See, e.g., Jeffrey F. Addicott, Operation DesertStorm: R.E. Lee or W.T. Sherman?,
136 MIL. L. REV. 115, 122 (1992) ("The wanton destruction and theft of nonmilitary property that resulted from that campaign arguably marked Sherman as one of the most infamous figures in American military history.").
110. See MARK GRIMSLEY, THE HARD HAND OF WAR: UNION MILITARY POLICY

TOWARD SOUTHERN CIVILIANS 1861-1865, at 159 (1995); Walters, supra note 67, at 468.
111. See Robisch, supra note 96, at 467.
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and bum it." 2 Following the destruction of Atlanta, Sherman led
his famous "march to the sea" to further cripple Georgia's economy, terminating in the capture of Savannah.11 3 Though aimed
primarily at manufacturing centers, Sherman sought to terrorize
the citizenry as well-"I can make this march and make Georgia
howl.

11 4

Finally, Sherman turned northward and laid waste to

much of South Carolina," 5 a venture that culminated
with the
116
surrender and subsequent burning of Columbia.
Sherman's actions stemmed from his belief in "total war," or the
idea that war pits not only competing military forces but competing societies." 7 Like Alva, Sherman exploited the psychological
effects of terror aimed at civilian populations to achieve political
objectives. As one contemporary South Carolinian explained:
"The destruction of Atlanta, the pillaging and burning of other
towns of Georgia, and the subsequent devastation along the march
of the Federal army through Georgia, gave sufficient earnest of
the treatment to be anticipated by South Carolina ....11tl8
But, as noted earlier, the territorial wars of the sixteenth century
necessarily focused on the capture and holding of fortified cities.
Failure to gain control of key strongpoints and to station friendly
forces to guard them left an advancing army vulnerable to attacks
on its supply line and left the town vulnerable to repossession by
the adversary. General Sherman, however, completely disavowed
such an approach. Occupying and protecting captured cities required expending scarce military resources. Instead, Sherman
elected to destroy, rather than hold, cities." 9
Take, for example, the unannounced bombardment of Atlanta.
As noted earlier, the Lieber Code provided for such action only to
112. See generally JOHN B. WALTERS, THE MERCHANT OF TERROR 127-52 (1973)
(describing the capture and burning of Atlanta); see also LLOYD LENVIS, SHERMAN:
FIGHTING PROPHET 410-85 (1958); 2 SHERMAN, supranote 67, at 137-267.
113. See Robisch, supra note 96, at 503-04; WALTERS, supranote 112, at 183-84.
114. Sherman, quoted in Addicott, supra note 109, at 123 n.29.
115. See 2 SHERMAN, supranote 67, at 268-321.
116. A great deal of dispute surrounds who actually burned Columbia, and whether
Sherman ordered or condoned its destruction. See generally WM.GILMORE SIMMS, SACK
AND DEsTRUCrION OF THE CITY OF COLUMBIA, S.C. (A.S. Salley ed., 2d ed., Oglethorpe
Univ. Press, 1937) (1865) (reporting the events of the surrender and subsequent burning
of the city). For conflicting accounts, see WHO BURNT COLUMBIA? (Charleston, Walker,
Evans & Cogswell, 1873) (reprinting depositions taken in preparation of a trial against
Sherman for his alleged burning of the city).
117. See Robisch, supranote 96, at 460.
118. SIMMS, supra note 116, at 27-28.
119. A notable exception was Savannah, discussed infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text
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prepare for a surprise assault. Yet, Sherman never attempted one.
In addition, Sherman ordered the evacuation and burning of the
city even after the Confederate Army had retreated and Sherman
was free to occupy it unresisted.120 Sherman's post-war memoirs
reveal his intentions to make the city an example to the rest of the
South: "I knew that the people of the South would read in this
measure two important conclusions: one, that we were in earnest;
and the other, if they were sincere in their common and popular
clamor 'to die in the last ditch,' that the opportunity would soon
121
come."
Vattel, Halleck, 1 and Lieber"2 would likely have deemed such
conduct wanton. Sherman's counterpart, Confederate General
Hood, described the uprooting of Atlanta's citizens as
"transcend[ing], in studied and ingenious cruelty, all acts ever before brought to my attention in the dark history of war." 24 Confederate President Jefferson Davis wrote of the incident: "Since
Alva's atrocious cruelties to the non-combatant population of the
Low Countries in the sixteenth century, the history of war records
no instance of such barbarous cruelty as that which [Sherman's]
order designed to perpetrate."" To them, the city ought first to
have been given an opportunity to surrender; following its capitulation, its property ought to have been protected. Sherman, however, calculated the necessity of his actions differently.
The role of cities in the national economy, and, though not yet
fully revealed, in warfare, was changing dramatically during the
course of the nineteenth century. Yet the laws of war regulating
their attack and surrender lagged far behind. Sherman's campaign, and its occasional deviation from seeming patterns, reflects
these tensions. Contrast his devastation of Atlanta with his cap120. See WALTERS, supra note 112, at 127-152.
121. 2 SHERMAN, supra note 67, at 111-12.
122. See HALLECK, supra note 99, at 427 ("So long as [enemy civilians] refrain from all
hostilities, pay the military contributions which may be imposed on them, and quietly
submit to the authority of the belligerent who may happen to be in the military possession
of their country, they are allowed to continue in the enjoyment of their property. ... ").
123. Upon Sherman's advance towards South Carolina, Lieber implored Halleck, "Let
Sherman, if such a thing be possible, levy the heaviest contributions, let him lay the yoke
of retribution heavy on the offenders of that offending State, but let there not be ruthless
burning, killing, violating women by the soldiery." FRANK FREIDEL, FRANCIS LIEBER 357
(1947).
124. Letter from Gen. Hood to Sherman (Sept. 9, 1864), in 2 SHERMAN, supra note 67,
at 119.
125. 2 JEFFERSON DAVIS, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT
564 (Sagamore Press 1958) (1881).
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ture of Savannah several months later, an exhibition much like
that of his early modem European counterparts. Upon reaching
the city he issued a warning that one might easily have attributed

to Alva or Cromwell:
I have for some days held and controlled every avenue by
which the people and garrison of Savannah can be sup-

plied, and I am therefore justified in demanding the surrender of the city ....

I am prepared to grant liberal

terms to the inhabitants and garrison; but should I be
forced to resort to assault, or the slower and surer process of starvation, I shall then feel justified in resorting to
the harshest measures, and shall make little effort to restrain my army .... 126

Although this summons was promptly refused, Confederate forces
escaped through a gap in Union lines. Rather than laying waste to
the evacuated city, Sherman presented it as a "Christmas gift" to
President Lincoln. 127 While a notable instance of restraint,
Sherman then turned north towards South Carolina, where he and
his forces abandoned those restraints in what would prove the
most destructive leg of his annihilation campaign.'2
Sherman's treatment of Southern cities, though brutal and arguably in violation of prevailing laws of war, harnessed the emergent role that cities then played within a nation, and sought to influence enemy decision making at the national, rather than the city
level. Because of their role in sustaining national war efforts,
Sherman reasoned that even those cities that did not actively resist
the Union Army still contributed to the Southern war effort. Traditional immunities granted unresisting cities, such as those guar126. Summons from Sherman to Gen. Hardee, Commander of Confederate Forces in
Savannah (Dec. 17,1864), in 2 SHERMAN, supranote 67, at 211.
127. See 2 SHERMAN, supra note 67, at 231.
128. See WALTERS, supra note 112, at 184-204. Union forces reserved the worst destruction for South Carolina, the first state to secede, whose population they viewed as
instigators of the rebellion. See GRIMSLEY, supra note 110, at 200-01. As Sherman's
forces set out northward, Halleck suggested, "Should you capture Charleston, I hope that
by some accident the place may be destroyed, and, if a little salt should be sown upon its
site, it may prevent the growth of future crops of nullification and secession." Letter from
Halleck to Sherman (Dec. 18, 1864), in 2 SHEMAN, supra note 67, at 223. Sherman responded: "I will bear in mind your hint as to Charleston, and do not think 'salt' will be
necessary... [Tihe whole army is burning with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance
upon South Carolina. I almost tremble at her fate, but feel that she deserves all that
seems in store for her." Letter from Sherman to Halleck (Dec. 24, 1864), in id., at 227-28.
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anteed in early modem Europe, were inconsistent with this view.
As Sherman intimated to his general-in-chief, Halleck, in September 1863: "[A]ll who do not aid us are enemies ....If the people
of the South oppose, they do so at their peril; and if they stand by,
mere lookers-on in this domestic tragedy, they have no right to immunity, protection,or share in the final results."2 9
Note the divergent underlying logic from that adopted by Alva
and his contemporaries, at a time when each city could be considered an isolated and independent unit. While sixteenth century
strategists desired, indeed they often depended on, the rapid capitulation of cities seeking to avoid destruction, Sherman wanted
to deny cities that very privilege. Instead, cities could only protect
themselves by compelling a nation-wide surrender. "If the people
raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I will answer that
war is war, and not popularity-seeking. If they want peace, they
and their relatives must stop the war. 130 Sherman thus frequently
cast aside the credible inducements to surrender so important to
sixteenth century siege warfare.
This divergence of strategic thinking reflected the changing political structure of nations and the role of cities within that structure. The independent political authority of cities, so common to
the early modem age, was simultaneously centralized in the modern state 13' but also diffused downwards to the democratic populace. As Sherman himself admonished, "... [T]his war differs
from European wars in this particular: we are not only fighting
hostile armies, but a hostile people, and must make old and young,
rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their organized
armies. '132 Because cities and their surrounding countryside no
longer functioned as quasi-autonomous political units, Sherman
adopted an ethical theory premised on collective responsibility: as
part of an enemy nation, every city, and every city resident, regardless of resistance, was subject to punishment. 33
Sherman's theory of warfare, then, turned the logic of strategy
of law of sixteenth century siege warfare upside down. Sherman
129. Letter from Sherman to Halleck (Sept. 17, 1863), in 1 SHERMAN, supra note 67, at
339 (emphasis added).
130. 2 SHERMAN, supra note 67, at 111 (emphasis added).
131. See MILLETr & MASLOWSKI, supra note 69, at 163 ("Massive mobilization required an unprecedented degree of centralized national control over military policy.").
132. Letter from Sherman to Halleck (Dec. 24, 1864), in 2 SHERMAN, supra note 67, at
227.

133. See Walters, supra note 67, at 462.
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did not desire that cities would surrender to his troops to avoid
sack, as most towns had done upon the approach of Alva and his
army. Quite the contrary, Sherman sought to compel nationalsurrender by denying cities the opportunity to avoid destruction. In
so doing, Sherman embraced the strategic logic that had governed
sieges during the early modern era, but he did so at the national
level. Just as the Spanish theologians of the sixteenth century argued that the suffering of city residents was the burden that a resisting garrison bore, so too Sherman argued that the entire South
had to bear the suffering attributable to the actions of rebels.
Sherman's concept of collective responsibility demonstrates
once again the complex interaction of law and strategy with the
changing political significance of cities. Sherman's view of cities as
components of a national war effort shaped his understanding of
the laws of war. Yet, in turn, the view of the laws of war he practiced-no individual or city ought to be guaranteed the right to
avoid the horrors of war through their own actions-formed a core
component of his strategy to erode national will. Sherman did not
merely see legal rules protecting undefended cities as a hindrance;
he viewed suspension of those rules, which lagged behind in a prenational vision of warfare, as a key pillar to his psychological strategy. Erosion of the enemy's national will required transmitting
the threat that every city, and its surrounding countryside, was
vulnerable until the entire nation surrendered. This required
overturning the very surrender immunities so central to previous
military eras.
In shedding its fortress walls of previous centuries, the nineteenth century city became increasingly vulnerable to destruction
in war, not for lack of fortification but because of its strategic significance as a component of national war effort. In the following
case, this phenomenon is taken to the extreme, as entire countries
come to resemble great, walled fortresses, while the unprotected
cities within become the primary targets of war.

IV.

CITIES AS NERVE CENTERS: THE ALLIED BOMBING OF

GERMANY IN WWII
A.

The Laws of Air Warfare: Were There Any?

Sherman's campaigns revealed mere glimpses of the vast
changes touching military affairs in the latter half of the nine-
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teenth century. Because European theorists and jurists tended to
discount the American Civil War experience as inapplicable to the
more refined European military tradition, 134 the laws of war regarding the attack and surrender of cities would change little during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. At the same
time, the strategic and political significance of cities, as concentrated loci of industrial power and popular will, continued to grow.
By the outbreak of World War II, military planners almost universally anticipated the widespread destruction of cities.
Between 1940 and 1945, the United States and Great Britain
dropped over 1,500,000 tons of high-explosive and incendiary
bombs over Germany, resulting in more than one million civilian
deaths or serious injuries. 35 The majority of these attacks were
delivered as part of the Combined Bomber Offensive, set in motion by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Win136
ston Churchill after their January 1943 Casablanca Conference.
During the next two years, round-the-clock bombardment of urban centers produced great fire-storms across Germany. Although dispute still surrounds the exact number of deaths caused
by individual raids, the bombardment of cities such as Berlin,
Hamburg, and Dresden left tens or even hundreds of thousands
137
dead, maimed, or homeless.
The Allied air campaign took Sherman's logic to the extreme:
The Allies attempted simultaneously to destroy Germany's capacity to wage war by wrecking its industrial production and to erode
German morale to the point where its war effort would collapse.
Devastating attacks on cities, it was hoped, would compel rapid
capitulation at the national level.
While the scale of destruction was of an entirely new magnitude
(only to be surpassed by the firebombings of Tokyo and again in
August 1945 with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki) the conduct of the Allied bombing campaign has generally
been considered within the bounds of the law of war as understood in the 1940s. 38 Although the Charter of the Nuernberg International Military Tribunal listed "indiscriminate bombings" as a
134. See MICHAEL HOWARD, STUDIES IN WAR AND PEACE 187 (1970).
135. See GEORGE H. QUESTER, DETERRENCE BEFORE HIROSHIMA 157-58 (1986).
136. See ROBERT A. PAPE, BOMBING To WIN: AIR POWER AND COERCION IN WAR

257-58 (1996).
137. See MARK CLODFELTER, THE LIMITS OF AIR POWER 6 (1989).
138. See W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 AIR FORCE L. REV. 1, 53-54
(1990).
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war crime, the United Nations War Crimes Commission rejected
alleged cases so long as the bombarded cities could be construed
as containing military objectives.1 9 One should not read too much
into these prosecutorial decisions alone-the Allies could not condemn strategic bombing practices in general without condemning
their own behavior-but they nevertheless reflect the centrality of
air bombardment in pre- and post-war military thought. In his final report as Chief Counsel for War Crimes at the Nuemberg Trials, Brigadier General Telford Taylor observed that the bombing
of cities reflected deliberate policy and "that aerial bombardment
of cities and factories ha[d] become a recognized part of modern
warfare as carriedon by all nations."14°
The predominant view as to why the laws of war prior to WWII
failed to limit aerial bombardment of cities holds that changes in
the nature of warfare rendered limits on destruction of cities strategically unviable-that the emergence of air power and the increasing reliance on the homefront to sustain a war effort made
aerial bombardment of cities inevitable. 4 ' While this view goes far
in explaining why jurists and treaty negotiators failed or refused to
develop strict limits on bombardment of cities, it gives inadequate
attention to the legal regime that did emerge. The regime that legitimized Allied bombing should be viewed not as an absence of
legal development but as the application of a long-established relationship between the targeting of cities and military strategy to a
new context, one that essentially embodies the same principles as
siege warfare but at a grander scale. To see why, it is necessary to
take a step back and pick up international legal development
where the previous episode left off.

139. See id at 38
140. TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE
NUERNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 65

(1949) (emphasis added).

141. See ag., Tami Davis Biddle, Air Power, in THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON
WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 140, 157 (Michael Howard et al. eds., 1994) ("The
murky laws on aerial bombardment that existed prior to World War II were much too
weak to constrain states... Strategic bombing was a largely untested idea which seemed
to many to hold the promise of making wars shorter, if more violent. Indeed, as we have
seen, it was in part this lure, and the concern that other states might gain an advantage,
that prevented adequate interwar restraints."); Parks, supra note 138, at 49 ("[Nleither
governments nor individual citizens placed much faith, if any, in the law of war (if the latter even knew of its existence) to prevent war or the aerial attacks upon the civilian
population that were anticipated by all.").
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The Legacy of Nineteenth Century Laws of War and the
Experience of the FirstWorld War

A decade after the American Civil War, delegates to the Brussels Convention of 1874 attempted to codify many of the provisions laid out in the Lieber Code. Article 15 of the final document
required that "[f]ortified places are alone liable to be besieged.
Open towns, agglomerations of dwellings, or villages which are not
defended can neither be attacked nor bombarded." 142
The concept of an "open town"-also referred to as the "open
city rule"-reflected European custom, as practiced during the
previous century. It allowed a military force defending a city to
withdraw in the face of a siege or imminent assault, yielding possession of the city to an attacker unopposed in return for sparing it
of further damage. 143 The 1899 Hague Regulations dropped the
reference to "open towns" and provided instead that "[t]he attack
or bombardment of towns, villages, habitation or buildings which
are not defended, is prohibited."'"
The 1899 rules were replaced the following decade by the 1907
Hague Regulations, which contained virtually identical provisions
regarding city attacks.1 45 A precise definition of "defended" remained illusive, however. To avoid confusion, the substance of the
"undefended places" rule remained that of its predecessor, the
"open city" rule; "undefended" cities were again thought to be
those that could be occupied immediately by the opposing force
without resistance. 46
This doctrine proved ill suited for modern warfare. Notice that
the open city rule assumes a mode of combat in which a city is defended and attacked from within its immediate vicinity; declaring a
city "open" required that an attacking force be able to occupy it in
return for granting its immunity. Changes in military technology,
142. Final Protocol of the Brussels Conference of 1874 art. 15, reprinted in THE LAWS
OF ARMED CONFLICTS 29 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 1988) [hereinafter
SCHINDLER & TOMAN].

143. See H. Wayne Elliott, Open Citiesand (Un)Defended Places, 1995 ARMY LAW. 39,
41, 43; Open Towns, 1945 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 258,259.
144. Annex to the 1899 Hague Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of
War on Land art. 25, reprintedin SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 142, at 83-84.
145. See id. The only significant difference in the language between the two conventions is that the 1907 version prohibits the bombardment of undefended towns "by whatever means," to include aerial bombardment in addition to land attack.
146. See Hamilton DeSaussure, The Laws of Air Warfare: Are There Any?, in 4 THE
VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 304, 307 (Richard A. Falk ed., 1976); Open
Towns, supra note 143, at 260.
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however, would soon erode the style of warfare upon which the
rule was predicated and would also render meaningless the oncesharp distinction between "defended" and "undefended" locales.
The experience of WWI spelled the open city rule's demise.
First, the stalemate on land generated by the introduction of
machine guns, barbed wire, and other innovations replaced the
fluid infantry and cavalry attacks of previous eras with static
trenchlines extending along "fronts" hundreds of miles long. 47
With a few exceptions, war on the Western Front thus took place
far from urban centers. It was the indecisiveness and horrible
mass slaughter of trench warfare-the British suffered 60,000
casualties on the first day of their 1916 Somme offensive,' 4s with
virtually no gain in territory-that led many to view WWI as "The
War to End all Wars."
At the same time, advancements in bombardment technology
now made cities and other targets far behind these battle lines vulnerable to attack. Air power is, of course, the most obvious of
these developments, though advances in the range and destructiveness of artillery also made bombardment of cities by distant
land forces a practical possibility. 14 9 The Germans, for example,
shelled Paris with their enormous "Big Bertha" gun from a distance of seventy miles. 0
The need and ability to bombard cities from long range would
have tremendous legal ramifications. As one military-legal theorist explained:
The limited capacity of artillery, extending nearly to the
twentieth century, localized military operations, restricting them to the immediate ground occupied by the military forces Out of this grew the idea of an operational
zone, or theater of war, within which active combat was
supposed to be conducted. It was this operational zone,
based on technical performances, and delimited solely by
the range of gun fire, which served as a basis for legal
147. See BRIAN BOND, WAR AND SOCIETY IN EUROPE, 1870-1970, at 102 (1983).
148. See JOHN KEEGAN, THE FACE OF BATTLE 260 (Penguin ed. 1978). By the end of
the battle, the British had suffered over 400,000 casualties, the French nearly 200,000. See
id. at 285.
149. For a discussion of the increased range of artillery during the nineteenth and early
twentieth century, see M.W. ROYSE, AERIAL BOMBARDMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WARFARE 168-69 (1928); MARTIN VAN CREVELD,
TECHNOLOGY AND WAR 170-71 (1989).
150. See BOND, supra note 147, at 115.
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speculation and finally led to attempts at legal definition
and regulation."'
Although improvements in artillery first began to erode traditional
lines of distinction, it was the advent of manned flight that
rendered the nineteenth century legal regime unworkable.
While aircraft were initially employed almost exclusively for reconnaissance and support of tactical maneuvers along the WWI
battle lines, both sides soon experimented with their use for
"strategic" bombardment-attacks on enemy targets far behind
the front lines.'52 After several bombing raids of British cities by
German Zeppelin dirigibles beginning in December 1914,153 Germany launched its first daylight raid on London with its giant
Gotha bombers in June 1917, killing 162 people and sowing widespread public panic.' 54 The Allies responded with bombing attacks
of their own on German towns and industrial targets.1 55 By the
time the armistice was signed, the two sides seemed ready to
abandon all limits on aerial raiding, and some evidence suggests
that the Allies were planning poison gas attacks against Berlin.' 56
Strategic air bombardment was hardly a decisive factor in the
war. Nevertheless, its potential in future wars attracted the attention of many prominent military planners. General J.C. Smuts, the
officer commissioned to study British air defense preparedness,
noted in his report that "the day may not be far off when aerial
operations with their devastation of enemy lands and destruction
of industrial and populous centres on a vast scale may become the
principal operations of war, to which the older forms of military
'5 7
and naval operations may become secondary and subordinate.'
These two transformations in the conduct and capabilities of
war, the emergence of "fronts" and the ability to bombard from
great distances, placed tremendous strain on the legal regime inherited from the previous century. In particular, they rendered
the doctrine of "undefended" places enunciated at the 1899 and
151. ROYSE, supra note 149, at 148-49 (citation omitted).
152. See BOND, supra note 147, at 115; QUESTER, supra note 135, at 20-21, 3940.
153. See QUESTER, supra note 135, at 18-19.
154. See id. at 32.
155. See id. at 38-46.
156. See id. at 44-46.
157. Second Report of the Prime Minister's Committee on Air Organization and Home
Defence Against Air Raids (Aug. 17, 1917), reprinted in APPS., H.A. JONES, THE WAR IN
THE AIR 8, 10 (1937).
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1907 Hague Conferences virtually meaningless by the fact that
traditional defensive perimeters of cities hardly existed anymore.
Cities were now defended by trench lines hundreds of miles away.
The advent of air power clouded the issue in other ways as well.
British military planners, for instance, were at odds over the question of anti-aircraft guns: if they chose to protect London from
aerial bombardment by installing search lights and artillery to
stave off an anticipated attack, did that qualify as "defended,"
thereby inviting a legal attack from the air? Conversely, could a
warring state use a city far behind the front lines as a storage depot for ammunition and military supplies but secure its immunity
from bombardment by neglecting to station defending troops
15
there? 1
Technology-driven changes in warfare had outgrown the legal
framework regarding attack and surrender of cities inherited from
the latter half of the previous century. These changes, however,
represent only one dimension of the dramatic shifts in strategy
that would propel the Allies' bombing campaign in WWH. The
continued industrialization of cities also elevated their importance
in the supply of materiel to sustain military operations. The need
to mobilize industry on such a large scale made the morale effects
on cities of greater import as well. Finally, the perceived fragility
of the European political order, and the conception of cities as
sites of potential mass uprising, made cities appear the perfect target to air power enthusiasts The entire triadic relationship among
cities, strategy, and law was in flux.
C. The Twentieth Century City as Nerve Center
As recounted in Part HI, even the earliest blossoming of industrialization in the southern United States transformed the role of
cities, and hence their strategic significance, within the state. The
character of an emerging manufacturing economy and the proliferation of railroad networks linked major cities inextricably to the
economic sustenance of the entire nation. At the same time, the
role of cities as concentrated loci of politics and symbols of modernity elevated their prominence as constitutive units of national
will.
These early transformations were magnified by the full-blown
industrialization of Western Europe during the latter half of the
158. See EMiott, supra note 143, at 43; Open Towns, supra note 143, at 261; Parks, supra
note 138, at 9, 17-19
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The rapid rise of factory economies

throughout Western Europe and the burgeoning of metropolises
housing over a million residents160 tightened the bonds of economic interdependence between cities. 61 Stripped of their perimeter walls and political isolation, cities were woven together
into an indivisible whole. These structural changes took place before a backdrop of solidifying nationalism, further uniting nations
under 2 the banner of common interests and political consciousness.

16

Sociologists and military planners described the modern state in
biological terms; it was an organism with cities as its "nerve centers." 163 This metaphor captured many of cities' most salient features: Cities formed interlocking webs of economic production;
cities played a coordinating function, lending order to national
policy; and cities represented conduits of national will. At the
same time, the biological metaphors captured the perceived vulnerabilities of this city-state relationship. The same interconnectedness that generated national wealth and bound citizens to collective ideology could, if disrupted, bring down the entire system.
Even before the experience of WWI, urban transformations,
along with the advent of aviation technology, led many theorists to
view the city's role in future conflict under new light. In his 1908
account of futuristic warfare, The War in the Air, H.G. Wells astutely prophesied that warring states would soon bypass traditional combat altogether. Instead, he surmized they would send
great air fleets to bomb major enemy population centers in an ef1 64
fort to sow nation-wide panic and compel immediate surrender.
In Wells' eyes, though, such efforts would likely backfire. Rather
than forcing quick capitulation at the national level, attacks from

159. See generally HOHENBERG & LEES, supra note 21, at 179-214 (describing the economic effects of industrialization on cities).
160. In 1910, there were seven European cities of more than one million inhabitants.
By 1940, there were sixteen. See J.M. ROBERTS, EUROPE, 1880-1945, at 373 (2d ed.
1989).
161. See HOHENBERG & LEES, supra note 21, at 240.
162. See R.R. PALMER & JOEL COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 468-72

(7th ed. 1992).
163. See MICHAEL S. SHERRY, THE RISE OF AMERICAN AIR POWER 26 (1987). For

abundant examples of biological metaphors to describe cities, see JOSEF W. KONVITZ,
CITIES AS TARGETS: CONCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC BOMBING, 1914-1945, at app.

(Woodrow Wilson Int'l Ctr. for Scholars Working Paper No. 85, 1987).
164. H.G. WELLS, THE WAR INTHE AIR (1908).
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the sky would fan the flames of mass patriotism, generating end165
less guerrilla warfare:
[W]ith the flying machine war alters in its character; it
ceases to be an affair of 'fronts' and becomes an affair of
'areas'; neither side, victor or loser, remains immune
from the gravest injuries, and while there is a vast increase in the destructiveness of war, there is also an increased indecisiveness. Consequently 'War in the Air'
means social destruction instead of victory as the end of
66
1

war.

Unlike Wells, however, many of those military planners advocating the development of large bomber forces saw the targeting
of urban centers as a way to avoid the horrible stalemate of WWI,
still fresh in the minds of all Europeans. Giulio Douhet, an Italian
officer and perhaps the most influential 67 of the interwar air
power advocates, remarked: "[W]e need only envision what would
go on among the civilian population of congested cities once the
enemy announced that he would bomb such centers relentlessly
.... How could a country go on living and working under this

constant threat, oppressed by the nightmare of imminent destruction and death?"'168 Like Wells, Douhet assumed that air warfare
flowed naturally and inevitably from the emerging strategic significance of cities as vital organs of the state. For Douhet, however, air warfare would be quick-the threat of massive aerial
bombardment alone would generate sufficient pressure to coerce
surrender. To those who shared these visions, this logic would dictate the course of future conflict from the moment it erupted:
London will be at once attacked as it was repeatedly on
the former occasion in exercise of the enemy's air power.
To argue otherwise is lunacy; and ...to assert that the

law of humanity will prevail is to flout precedent in a
proceeding which knows no law....
165. Id. at 350-75; see also SHERRY, supra note 163, at 8-9.
166. H.G. WELLS, Preface (1921), in THE WAR INTHE AIR, at 5 (New York, MacMillan 1922) (1908).
167. It remains disputed how widely Douhet's writings were read by American air
planners. Nevertheless, his ideas, even if not always duly attributed, pervaded American
air power theory development during the interwar and WWII period. See CARL H.
BUILDER, THE ICARUS SYNDROME: THE ROLE OF AIR POWER THEORY IN THE
EvOLUTION AND FATE OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE 50-51 (1994).
168. GIULIO DOUHET, THE COMMAND OF THE AIR 20-22 (Dino Ferrari trans.. Office
of Air Force History 1983) (1921).
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The enemy would be acting in strict accordance with
the higher strategy, for they would rightly calculate that
direct pressure thus applied in wholesale fashion against
the spirit of resistance of the masses might break the nation's will to war and induce a hurried peace. 69
...

Though yet untested in war, the views of sociologists, futurists,
and military planners-that aerial bombardment would induce urban social and political collapse-appeared to resonate in events
across Europe during the interwar years. With memories of British and French WWI morale problems still lingering, incidents like
the British general strike of 1926 and the Paris riots of 1934
seemed to confirm their predictions.170 The 1917 Russian Revolution frightfully demonstrated cities' potential as sites of mass social
uprising,171 and the 1921 Kronstadt mutiny, in the wake of strikes
and riots in Moscow and Petrograd, displayed the speed with
172
which instability could spread from city to city:
Certainty about the bomber's efficacy rested on an appreciation of new technology, but also on unquestioned
belief in the fragility of modem societies. All the
achievements in which Europe once gloried-material
wealth, economic interdependence, sophisticated communications-now seemed cause for the gravest worry
that the home front had become hopelessly vulnerable. 173
It was precisely this hopeless vulnerability that American and
British air staffs sought to exploit during their interwar planning.1 74
Both of their planning efforts viewed cities as defenseless and delicate nerve centers, but their deviations illustrate two popular conceptions of modem cities as nerve centers of the state. Although
the conduct of the Allies' respective efforts in WWII eventually
converged, American air planners during the interwar period em169. L.E.O. CHARLTON, THE MENACE OFTHE CLOUDS 37-38 (1937).
170. See Davis Biddle, supra note 141, at 147; KONVITZ, supra note 163, at 5-12.
171. See HOHENBERG & LEES, supra note 21, at 283.
172. See generally PAUL AVRICH, KRONSTADT 1921, at 35-87 (1970) (detailing the
eruption of anti-Bolshevik discontent in major Russian cities and its spread to the military
base at Kronstadt). The political writings of Lenin, see, for example, V.I. Lenin, What Is
To Be Done? (1902), in LENIN ON POLITICS AND REVOLUTION 31, 39-40 (James E. Connor ed., 1968), reflect his own observations that social discontent and uprising had a great
propensity to spread among cities, which had witnessed considerable industrialization in
Russia since the birth of Marxist thought during the previous century. See James E. Connor, Introductionto LENIN ON POLITICS AND REVOLUTION, supra, at xi, xvii.
173. SHERRY, supra note 163, at 26.
174. See KONVITZ, supra note 163, at 5-24.
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phasized the utility of destroying the enemy's economic and industrial infrastructure.

Their British counterparts, by contrast, fo-

cused on erosion of enemy civilian morale.7 5 Both, however,
viewed air attacks on enemy cities as a means to achieve quick victory while avoiding the costly and protracted struggle of recent
conflicts.
Plans developed at the U.S. Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS)
stressed precision bombardment of key industrial nodes.'76 This
planning reflected a vision of modem state economies as
"industrial webs" With two-fold strategic implications. First, a
well-orchestrated attack on certain critical elements of an adversary's economic system would cause its entire disintegration."7
Hitting vital industrial targets and key elements of the enemy's
economic infrastructure would therefore paralyze its war-making
capability.1 78 Second, economic collapse through precision bombing would dissolve the civilian population's will to resist, hastening
a rapid surrender. As an ACTS lecturer observed in 1936, "A nation's attacking air force would be at liberty to proceed directly to
the ultimate aim in war: overthrow of the enemy will to resist
through the destruction of those vital elements upon which mod1 79
em social life is dependent."
British planning similarly assumed that strategic bombing would
bring about rapid collapse of the enemy's war effort. Their emphasis, however, lay primarily With direct effects on morale. Attacks on entire urban sectors, as opposed to the pinpoint attacks
on economic targets envisioned by American planners, would create mass panic, resulting in overthrow of the enemy governmentY"
Part of this emphasis on direct morale effects stemmed from British experience during WWI. British Major General Hugh Trenchard, a key architect of the Allied strategic bombing efforts of
WWI, claimed confidently after the war, though without scientific
basis, that "the moral effect of bombing stands undoubtedly to the
material effect in a proportion of 20 to .'1' In contrast to Ameri175. For a comparison of American and British interwar air planning, see PAPE, supra
note 136, at 60-66; QUESTER, supra note 135, at 60-72.
176. See PAPE, supra note 136, at 62.
177. See id.
178. See Ed Crowder, Pointblank-A Study in Strategic and National Security Decision
Making, 6 AIRPOWER J. 55,59 (1992).
179. Lt. Haywood Hansell, quoted in CLODFELTER, supranote 137, at 2.
180. See PAPE, supra note 136, at 61; 1 CHARLES WEBSTER & NOBLE FRANKLAND,
THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST GERMANY 26-29 (1961).
181. Gen. Trenchard, quoted in 6 JONES, supranote 157, at 136.
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can plans for precision bombing, British planners stressed the targeting of heavily populated urban "areas." 1 2
The two Allied planning efforts, reflecting many of the same assumptions about vulnerability of cities to bombardment and the
relationship of industrial cities to the functioning of the state, fed
directly into the Combined Bomber Offensive launched in January
1943.83 Its stated purpose was "to bring about the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and
economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where the capacity for armed resistance is
fatally weakened." 184
D. The Laws of Air Warfare and the Allied Bombing of
Germany, 1943-1945
The Allied strategic bombing campaign did indeed attempt to
bring about the total collapse of Germany's ability to resist. As
the campaign progressed these raids proved increasingly destructive; major German cities were reduced to rubble and ashes one by
one. While American planners initially adhered to their belief in
precision attacks on vital economic targets, lack of accuracy and
the quickly dissipating effects of such raids led to a convergence of
American and British efforts devoted to destroying entire urban
areas.
According to the post-war United States Strategic Bombing
Survey, the Combined Bomber Offensive killed 305,000 German
civilians while wounding 780,000 and rendering 1,865,000 homeless."" The results, however, never measured up to the projections
of interwar air advocates. Not until the last several months of the
war did this heavy bombardment yield measurable effects on
Germany's capacity for war-making. 18 In addition, the empirical
effects of bombing proved exaggerated the interwar predictions of
advocates like Douhet: "Under ruthless control [the German people] showed surprising resistance to the terror and hardships of repeated air attack, to the destruction of their homes and belong182. For comparisons between American and British planning and their underlying assumptions, see PAPE, supra note 136, at 60-66; KONVITZ, supra note 163, at 5-24.
183. See generally 3 WEBSTER & FRANKLAND, supra note 180, at 284-311 (providing a
history of the Allied strategic air campaign).
184. Casablanca Directive, quoted in Crowder, supra note 178, at 61.
185. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, quoted in CLODFELTER, supra note 137,
at 8.
186. See 3 WEBSTER & FRANKLAND, supra note 180, at 302-04;

1999]

THE LAW AND STRATEGY OF CITIES AS TARGETS

393

ings, and to the conditions under which they were reduced to
live." 187 These conclusions were reiterated in the official British
history of the air campaign: "The cardinal error of intelligence was
the description of the German economy as tightly stretched ...
when it was, in reality, resilient, cushioned and increasingly productive, and of the German people as exhausted, disaffected and
liable to panic and revolt when, in reality, ... they were vigorous,

calm, stoical and loyal. '188
Though extreme in its destruction, the Allied air campaign has
generally been deemed as falling within prevailing laws of war at
the outbreak of WWH. A common justification has been that the
legal regime governing aerial bombardment was, at best, ambiguous; although the Allies may have pushed the regime to its limits,
their actions were not prohibited by any international agreement.
Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris, the commander of British bombing
efforts, declared after the war, "International law can always be
argued pro and con, but in this matter of the use of aircraftin war
there is, it so happens, no internationallaw at all."'19 However,
viewing the emerging regime within the context of the changed
political and strategic significance of cities reveals the legal regulation of aerial bombardment not as an absence of law but instead as
a modem application of the oldest precepts of siege warfare.
Recall that the laws of bombardment inherited from the nineteenth century initially fed attempts to regulate air warfare according to the status of targets as defended or undefended. Such
attempts proved unworkable in an era when cities might be defended from great distances and might contain, though undefended, vital military assets. Interwar jurists sought instead to
limit aerial bombardment according to the nature of the target,
turning on whether it contained military value.
The clearest doctrinal shift in this direction occurred in the early
1920s, when a major effort to limit air bombardment took place at
the Hague. National delegations from the major European powers (excluding Germany) as well as the United States and Japan
convened in 1922-23 to negotiate regulations on air warfare.'t 0
187. See United States Strategic Bombing Survey, quoted in CLODFELTER. supra note
137, at 9; see also STEPHEN T. HOSMER, PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF U.S. AIR
OPERATIONS IN FOUR WARS 1941-1991, at 9-11 (1996)(noting that the psychological effects of air operations against Germany fell short of pre-war expectations).
188. 3 WEBSTER & FRANKLAND, supra note 180, at 302.
189. ARTHUR HARRIS, BOMBER OFFENSIVE 177 (1947) (emphasis added).
190. See Parks,supra note 138, at 27-28.
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Jurists at the 1923 Draft Conference wrestled with the following
paradox: if they immunized cities from aerial bombardment, they
would create an incentive for states to move strategically valuable
assets (such as military industries) into densely populated areas,
thereby inviting the very attacks on cities the legal reformers
sought to protect. 9 ' Hence, they sought to proscribe urban targets
based on the purpose of bombardment and the nature of the target itself:
Art. 22. Aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorizing the civilian population, of destroying or damaging
private property not of military character, or of injuring
non-combatants is prohibited.

Art. 24. (1) Aerial bombardment is legitimate only when
directed at a military objective, that is to say, an object of
which the destruction or injury Would constitute a distinct
military advantage to the belligerent.
(2) Such bombardment is legitimate only when directed
exclusively at the following objectives: military forces;
military works; military establishments or depots; factories constituting important and well-known centers engaged in the manufacture of arms ....
(3) The bombardment of cities towns, villages, dwellings
or buildings not in the immediate neighborhood of the
operations of land forces is prohibited. .. 192
The Hague Air Rules were never ratified by the Conference
parties and therefore never gained binding force. 93 Their rejection was driven in large part by their inconsistency with strategic
efficiency: as outlined earlier, military planners saw bombardment
94
of industrial centers as the quickest means to secure victory.
191. See id. at 17-18, 28.
192. Hague Rules of Air Warfare, 1923 arts. 22, 24 reprinted in SCHINDLER AND
TOMAN, supra note 142, at 210.
193. See Parks, supra note 138, at 35; see also U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR
FORCE PAMPHLET 110-31, International Law-The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air
Operations,ch. 5, p. 3 (1976) (stating that the Hague Rules "do not represent existing customary law as a total code") (emphasis in original).
194. See Heinz Marcus Hanki, The 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare: A Contributionto
the Development of InternationalLaw Protecting Civilians from Air Attack, 1993 INT'L
REV. RED CROSS 12, 19; Parks, supra note 138, at 31.
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From a legal standpoint, the Hague Rules faced stiff resistance because they represented a radical reversal of the core principles
guiding the attack of cities during the previous several centuries.
In particular, the Rules sought to shift responsibility for harm suffered by civilians to the attacker.19 5
Part II explained that the laws of siege warfare were built upon
the notion that the defender bore the burden of harm to civilians.
"[C]ollateral civilian casualties during a siege were regarded as a
burden upon the besieged commander-an inducement to end the
siege. Bombardment ...resulting in collateral civilian casualties
was not illegal; it was merely a cost of doing the business of
war.' '1 96 As the British international legal scholar J.M. Spaight explained in 1911, "It is the impossibility of separating a fortified or
defended town from its inhabitants which justifies the bombardment of it; there is a certain solidarity between the garrison and
the residents which makes them, as it were, brothers in misfortune
when the enemy is at its gates."'" By the end of WWII,however,
Spaight recognized the inapplicability of "defended" as the true
test of legitimate attack: "[T]he criterion of defence has in its turn
become outmoded. A town's immunity rests to-day on its containing no military objectives ... ."198 In other words, the defender
still bore the burden of incidental harm to civilians, but not due to
a city's decision to defend itself but due to the state's grand decisions to resist attack and then to place militarily valuable resources
in the vicinity of urban centers.
The shift in emphasis to the character of targets and the incorporation of traditional responsibility for incidental harm lying with
the defender pervaded military manuals published during the interwar years. The British Manual of Military Law, for example,
stated that:
No legal duty exists for the attacking force to limit bombardment to the fortifications or defended border only.
On the contrary, destructioni of private and public buildings by bombardment has always been, and still is, con-

195.
196.
197.
198.

See Parks, supranote 138, at 31-32.
Id. at 19.
SPAIGHT, supra note 96, at 158.
J.M. SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 261 (3d ed., 1947).
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sidered lawful, as it is one of the means to impress upon
the local authorities the advisability of surrender. 199
M .W. Royse, a prominent interwar authority on the international law of war, similarly concluded:
It cannot reasonably be affirmed to-day that it is wrongful or illegal to bombard a military objective, fairly regarded as such, by all available means of attack; nor does
a military objective lose that character merely because it
is situated in the midst of a crowded city remote from the
immediate zone of land operations. Military objectives
are likely to be hunted down and attacked, and the fact
that incidental harm may fall upon non-combatants and
that the incidental destruction of property may at times
approximate devastation probably will be accepted, as
heretofore, as an unavoidable incident of warfare.2°
In limiting aerial bombardment according to the military character of targets, jurists and drafters of military manuals set up the legal defense of the mass destruction visited upon Germany. On the
one hand, regulations based on the character of targets could be,
and ultimately were, interpreted broadly. Industrialization and
urbanization trends meant that any major city housed crucial military resources or represented a key link in an enemy's war-making
capacity. In addition, while the emerging legal regime disavowed
the direct terrorization of a civilian population through bombardment, it said nothing about the incidental morale effects of bombing military targets. That is, the regime recognized a distinction
between the deliberate targeting of civilians for their own sake
versus the strategic use of unavoidable damage to civilians. It is
immediately evident that the strategic calculi underlying Allied
plans sought to harness this incidental damage to achieve their desired ends. As Prime Minister Winston Churchill remarked to
President Roosevelt in 1941, "[W]e must subject Germany and Italy to a ceaseless and ever growing air bombardment. These
measures may themselves produce an internal convulsion or collapse.

' 201

199. Manual of Military Law 1929, Amend. 12 (Jan. 1936) at 31, quoted in Parks, supra
note 138, at 39.
200. ROYSE, supra note 149, at 241.
201. Letter from Churchill to Roosevelt (July 25, 1941), in ROOSEVELT AND
CHURCHILL: THEIR SECRET WARTIME CORRESPONDENCE 151 (Francis L. Loewenheim
et al. eds., Da Capo ed. 1990).
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Spaight's apologist, post-war account confirmed that "[i]f in no
other way than by target-area bombing can a belligerent destroy
his enemy's armament centres ... , then target-area bombing cannot be considered to offend against the principles of the international law of war."'' °2 For Spaight, the key distinction remained
that of intentional versus incidental bombing of civilians. While
noting that "[b]ombing for a moral effect only remains unlawful," 2°3 he went on to defend Allied bombing as "designed to deIn effect, the
stroy Germany's material capacity to make war."'
fusion of technological, economic, and strategic transformations
had conflated notions of direct and indirect, intentional and incidental effects while allowing jurists to retain these distinctions in
the abstract.
E.

Strategic Bombing as Siege Warfare

Failure to limit aerial bombardment through international
regulation has been described by some critics as a rejection of any
legal structure2 5 Indeed, the legal standards governing WWII
strategic bombing lacked the clarity of the mechanical rules that
had previously regulated the attack and surrender of cities in
European warfare. However, by viewing the development of this
interwar regime not in isolation-as the law of war's inability to
keep pace with technological change-but within the context of
changes in the triadic relationship of cities, strategy, and law, a
more enlightened picture emerges.
In describing the military experience of WWI, the British military theorist J.F.C. Fuller described the encirclement of Germany
While the
and its allies as "the most gigantic siege in history."''
allusion to the ancient form of warfare is interesting as an illustration of the protracted struggle along the trench-lined fronts,
Fuller's observation bears directly on the way in which changes in
military strategy interacted with emerging laws of air warfare
during the interwar years.
Recall that the impregnability of sixteenth century fortress
towns legitimized the bombardment of civilian property and justified the sacking of towns in the event of an assault; the act of resisting attack, and the resulting perceived necessity of compelling
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

SPAIGHT, supra note 198, at 271.
Id. at277.
Id. at 279.
See DeSaussure, supranote 146, at 306-07.
J.F.C. FULLER, WAR AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 1832-1932, at 231 (1932).
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surrender through raising the costs of resistance, shifted responsibility for destruction of cities to the defender. "Bomber" Harris,
himself, summoned these customs in defending his conduct after
the war:
I never forget, as so many do, that in all normal warfare
of the past, and of the not distant past, it was the common practice to besiege cities and, if they refused to surrender when called upon with due formality to do so,
every living thing in them was in the end put to the
sword.... And as to bombardment, what city in what
war has ever failed to receive the maximum bombardment from all enemy artillery
within range so long as it
2°7
has continued resistance?
It was precisely because a besieging army had no direct means
of gaining control of a city that the laws of war recognized the necessity of raising the costs of resistance through actions
(starvation, bombardment, and occasionally an assault through a
breach in defenses) that inevitably brought suffering upon the civilian population. The ultimate object of an early modem siege
was not to terrorize noncombatants, though strategists and jurists
clearly recognized that civilians would suffer and that such suffering might hasten attainment of legitimate military ends.
Upon consideration of Fuller's observation, it appears that the
logic underlying the laws of air warfare in the interwar period mirrored those forming the basis of siege warfare. The costly yet indecisive struggles along WWI fronts (coupled with enormous investments in territorial defenses such as the French Maginot line)
along with the perception that threatening the inhabitants of states
(cities) could generate pressure for surrender, gave rise to a similar strategic logic:
In World War I ... decision was sought and attained by
gradual attrition of the enemy's entire manpower and
materiel reserves, and by choking off his supplies. The
war was essentially a gigantic siege operation ....
Western strategic thinking in World War II was guided
by this experience: the strategic task was defined in terms
of reducing Germany by siege.2 °8
207. HARRIS, supra note 189, at 177.
208. PAUL KECSKEMETI, STRATEGIC SURRENDER 7 (1958).
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Sherman's march through the South-seeking to induce national surrender by denying cities the opportunity to avoid destruction-turned the sixteenth century legal regime on its head.
The Allied bombing campaign took this inversion one step further,
by turning the city-state relationship of early modern Europe inside-out.
Rather than a nation-state comprised of quasiautonomous but individually impregnable fortresses, the modern
state possessed a virtually fortified national frontier. It was individual cities Within that now lay open and vulnerable to attack
from above.
Ironically, by rejecting a nineteenth century regime, based upon
the "open city" rule, jurists appeared to be casting aside the very
set of rules that derived from siege warfare and attacks on fortified
cities. Quite the contrary, in rejecting these rules in favor of standards based on military value, the interwar regime adopted the
same principles that had long governed siege-style warfare, though
on a magnified, grander scale.

V.

CITIES AS ETHNOGRAPHY: THE YUGOSLAV CONFLICT AND
THE REVIVAL OF SIEGE WARFARE

A. The Yugoslav Conflict: A New City, State, and Law
Relationship?
While the laws of siege warfare have received virtually no explicit attention in academic or juristic literature over the past several decades,' the recent conflict in the former Yugoslavia rekindled images of the "besieged" fortress town. The Serb campaign
to carve out an ethnically contiguous state following the 1991 declaration of independence by former Yugoslav republics frequently
involved the encirclement and bombardment of Bosnian and
Croatian cities. Such attacks became the focus of world-wide media attention. "[T]he international community," declared Secretary of State Warren Christopher in 1993, "will not accept the
laying siege of cities and the continued bombardment of civilians,
[or] the denial of humanitarian assistance to people in need...." 210
209. See James Turner Johnson, War for Cities and Noncombatant Immunity in the
Bosnian Conflict, in RELIGION AND JUSTICE INTHE WAR OVER BOSNIA 63, 79-80 (G.
Scott Davis ed., 1996).
210. Statement by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, reprintedin 4 U.S. DEPr OF
STATE DISPATCH 584 (1993).
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Serb city attacks ultimately led to NATO's extensive air strike operation in the summer of 1995,211 which played a major role in
forging the Dayton Peace Accords. 2
While reminiscent of the style and imagery of combat dominant
in centuries past, the Yugoslav conflict deviated in important respects from siege warfare of prior eras. Most notably, the ethnic
makeup of urban targets, besides their military significance, drove
strategy.213
The addition of this ethnic dimension to war has enormous consequences for the interaction of law and strategy. The special
characteristics of ethnic warfare, and the ambition of carving out
an ethnically homogenous state from a multi-ethnic landscape,
placed additional pressures on the legal regime governing attack of
cities. The reactions of the international community to Serb city
attacks illuminate this tension and provide a lens through which
we can view the direction in which the legal regime is moving.
The widespread condemnation of Serb conduct might suggest an
emerging consensus in favor of the restrictive provisions regulating
the attack of cities found in the Additional Protocols of 1977 to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 (hereinafter Protocol I). A close examination of the international community's response to the conflict-as found in the Western media and activities of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter
International Tribunal)-reveals far less consensus regarding the
emerging legal regime than one might suppose.214 The conduct of
the Yugoslav conflict exposes growing strain, not harmony, between law and strategy of modern conflict.
211. See Rick Atkinson & John Pomfret, NATO Renews Airstrikes on Serb Positions,
WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 1995, at 1; Roger Cohen, NATO Resumes Bombardment of Serbs,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1995, at. 1.
212. See John Pomfret, Bosnian Serb Losses Could Give Boost to Peace Prospects,
WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1995, at A13.
213. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Tadic Judgement,
at II(A)(3)-(5) (1997) <www.un.org/icty/970507jt.htm#_Toc387417235>; SUSAN L.
WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY 233-34 (1995).

214. In focusing on the Serb campaign and alleged Serb violations of international law,
I do not mean to suggest that they were exclusively responsible for atrocities. Rather, I
focus on their campaign as illustrative of the way in which much of the war was fought and
also because the Western media's emphasis on alleged Serb aggression reflects the strongest views on the emerging legal regime's content. Cf Alexander Cockburn, Editorial,
When Serbs Are Cleansed,It's Silence; Contrary to Media Accounts, the Serbs Are Not the
Only Force of Evil in the Bosnian Conflict, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1995, at B9 (noting that
Western media coverage tended to obscure the brutality of non-Serb parties to the conflict).
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City-Based Warfare in the FormerYugoslavia

In June 1991 Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from
Yugoslavia, a federal state formed at the close of WWI comprised
of six republics. Several months later the republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (hereinafter Bosnia) followed suit. Although the
Yugoslav Army later agreed to withdraw from these regions, local
ethnic Serbs quickly rose up, with the assistance of Serbia, and
seized large portions of Croatian and Bosnian territory in an attempt to carve out their own independent states.215 So began the
dissolution of the Yugoslav state and the four-year offensive by
ethnic Serbs to create a Greater Serbia from territories occupied
by Bosnian Muslims and ethnic Croats.
Although the military conflict took many forms, Western media
focused predominantly on the plight of Croatian and Bosnian cities. Among the earliest attacks on urban targets was the Serb envelopment and bombardment of Dubrovnik, a Croatian city lying
on the Dalmatian coast. Several months earlier, the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and local Serb militia forces had attacked the
Croatian city of Vukovar. Three months of siege reduced the baroque town to ashes and rubble.216 In October 1991, Serb forces
similarly invaded the Dubrovnik area from several sides, imposed
a naval blockade of the district, and commenced bombardment of
the city.2 17 After surrounding the area, the JNA issued an ultimatum demanding departure of all Croatian military forces and removal of elected public officials. These demands were promptly
refused.218 For the next thirteen months, this stranglehold and intermittent attacks on the city, with its rings of medieval fortifications, helped galvanize Western opinion against the Serbs.219 A
New York Times editorial lamented in November 1991, "To

215. See generally MISHA GLENNY, THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA (rev. ed. 1993)
(recounting the collapse of the Yugoslav state and the commencement of the conflict).
216. See Chuck Sudetic, Croats Concede Danube Town's Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18.
1991, at A3.

217. See Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, U.N. SCOR, 26, U.N. Doe. S119941674lAnnex
XI.A (1994) [hereinafter Final Report of the Commission of Experts].
218. See id 7 59.
219. See Chuck Sudetic, As Siege Ends, CroatsReturn to Ruined City. N.Y. TIMES. Nov.
3, 1992, at A6; Adam LeBor & Michael Evans, Yugoslav Commander Threatens To Halt
CroatianWithdrawal, TIMES (London), OcL 20, 1992, availablein LEXIS, News Library
UnderSiege: Yugoslavia, ECONOMIST, Nov. 2,1991, at 45.
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Guernica, Coventry, Stalingrad and Dresden the world may now
add Vukovar and Dubrovnik."' 20
The most well publicized siege of the conflict, however, was that
of Sarajevo. From April 1992 until the termination of the conflict,
Serb forces surrounded the low-lying capital city and rained shells
upon the town below." As the U.N. Commission of Experts declared in their 1994 report, "[T]he operations at Sarajevo have developed into a classic siege, with neither side being in possession of
'222
either the will or the military ability to force a conclusion.
In addition to the recurrent waves of bombardment, Serb forces
blocked the inflow of food, water, energy, and humanitarian relief
to the city.223 In doing so they began the slow strangulation of the
city reminiscent of warfare in early modem Europe, when defensive fortification systems precluded direct assaults. Wrote one city
resident in July 1992:
Today ...is an anniversary: one hundred days of solitude. It has been exactly a hundred days since the first
shot was fired on a citizen of Sarajevo, when a sniper
killed a young girl who was walking across a bridge. Until that day, the bridge was simply a way of crossing a
river we shared. Since then, it has become a border, the
sign of intolerable division. 2 4
Already by November 1993 the New York Times reported a toll of
12,000 killed and 56,000 wounded in the siege. 2 1
While Sarajevo was the most widely publicized, the storming of
Srebrenica, in eastern Bosnia, represented one of the bloodiest
city attacks of the war. In July 1995 Serb forces overran a Dutch
peacekeeping contingent and seized the city and its outlying suburbs.1 6 After this successful storm, Serb forces massacred thou220. Listen to the Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1991, at A30.
221. See WOODWARD, supra note 213, at 235.

222. FinalReport of the Commission of Experts, 32.
223. See John F. Bums, U.N. Says Bosnia Factions Block Winter Supplies, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 14, 1993, at A14; John F. Bums, In War for Bosnia, the Only Winner Is Despair,N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1993, at Al; see also Joel Havemann, EC Endorses Force If Needed for
Sarajevo Aid, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 1992, at Al (reporting the European Community's
endorsement of humanitarian aid shipments and consideration of military options to ensure relief efforts).
224. ZLATKO DIZDAREVIC, SARAJEVO: A WAR JOURNAL 101 (1993).
225. See Bums, In War for Bosnia, the Only Winner Is Despair,supra note 223, at Al.
226. See DAVID OWEN, BALKAN ODYSSEY 326-27 (1995).
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sands of Muslims and brutally laid waste to the town.m Upwards
of 40,000 Muslim civilians streamed from the city and its surrounding area to avoid further terrorization m Serb forces fol-

lowed up this invasion with a similar assault against the nearby enclave of Zepa. Again, great waves of Muslim civilians fled the city
and its suburbs.229

The Serbs' emphasis on encirclement or conquest of Bosnian
and Croatian cities flowed from the geographic features of

Bosnian and Croatian territory, as well as military and political
characteristics of the conflict. Because of its undulating, mountainous terrain, control of major cities was necessary to secure
routes between the various regions.3- Furthermore, the location
of cities along major transportation links between Bosnia and Serbia made their capture vital to linking Serbs' territorial gains to
their parent state.231 Only control of cities secured control of these
key connecting roadsm
From a military operational standpoint, siege represented the
most viable form of warfare because the Serbs possessed abundant
artillery while lacking sufficient manpower to overrun cities by direct means. 3 The raising of Muslim militia forces in Bosnia and
the deployment of defensive barricades throughout major cities
such as Sarajevo made a quick assault on cities too costly to con-

template seriously.?

One of the earliest military lessons of the

conflict, after the first Serb city attacks, appeared to be the terribly

227. See id. at 327; Stephen Kinzer, Hague Tribunal Weighs InternationalArrest Warrantsfor Two Top Bosnian Serbs, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1996, at A10.
228. See Chris Hedges, Bosnian Serbs Open Drive on a Second U.N. 'Safe Area, N.Y.
TIMES, July 14, 1995, at A8; Chris Hedges, Second 'Safe Area' in Eastern Bosnia Overrun
by Serbs, N.Y. TIMEs, July 20, 1995, at Al; Stephen Kinzer, Terrorized Human Tide
Overwhelms Relief Camp, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1995, at A4; Stacy Sullivan. Serbs Allow
Bosnia Refugees Few Places to Run for Safety, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 20, 1995,
at 6; UN Soldiers Pushed Aside in Fightingfor 'Safe Area', CHI. TRIB., July 16, 1995, at
A3.
229. See Chris Hedges, Second 'Safe Area' in Eastern Bosnia Overrnn by Serbs, supra
note 228, at Al.
230. See Johnson, supranote 209, at 81.
231. See 1 Annexes to the FinalReport of the Commission of Experts, U.N. SCOR, 11
12-14, U.N. Doc. Sl199416741Add.2 (1995) [hereinafter Annexes].
232. This logic was probably based on the assumption that the conflict would likely remain a conventional, as opposed to guerrilla, war. During WWII, Yugoslav partisan guerrillas took advantage of the Balkan terrain to pose a constant threat to German occupied
forces, despite German control of major cities. See PAUL N. HEHN, THE GERMAN
STRUGGLE AGAINST YUGOSLAV GUERRILLAS INWORLD WAR 1167-69,93-96 (1979).
233. See WOODWARD, supranote 213, at 235.
234. See Bums, In Warfor Bosnia, the Only Winner Is Despair,supra note 223, at Al.
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high price of capturing urban areas with infantry forces.235 "So instead, the Serbs rediscovered the medieval siege, putting citizens
under barrage and psychological pressure but not launching a
frontal attack. '' z36 Occasionally, as in Srebrenica, rapid assault was
possible. In most cases, however, the Serbs' wealth of firepower
but paucity of infantry troops limited their options to protracted
siege operations. In Sarajevo these constraints, combined with
Muslim forces' inability to defend against bombardment from the
hills, made siege the natural device. 7 The great advantages held
by urban defenses over assaulting forces ensured that city-by-city
warfare, rather than fluid battle lines, would dominate the conflict.
But aside from these geographic and military factors, the political objectives driving the Serb offensive produced the greatest motivation for besieging cities. In particular, the twin goals of expelling opposing ethnic groups and shattering symbols and
manifestations of multi-ethnicity made cities enticing targets.
To the Serbs, cities posed obstacles in their path toward ethnic
and nationalist homogeneity. Creation of a viable Serb state
within Bosnian and Croatian territory therefore required expelling
rival ethnic groups. 8 Serb strategy aimed not at destroying the
enemy militarily but ultimately on securing its claim to territory,
"an aim that includes having a population in place that supports
the political aims of the side in question." z 9
Dubbed "ethnic cleansing,2 14 0 these ambitions could be most efficiently furthered by brutal attacks on cities, home to large proportions of the population and concentrations of civilians prone to
terrorization. "The overriding political goal of depopulating these
areas of non-Serbs determined the nature of the military activities.
These areas were ... civilian areas with strategic importance derived from the fact that they linked Serbia with Serbs in [Bosnia]
and Croatia ....
Confrontation lines [were] therefore in and
around cities and villages .... 241 Highly publicized terrorization
of cities would cause urban populations, along with residents of
235. See OWEN, supra note 226, at 84. For a first-hand military analysis of the problems
faced by Serb military forces in assaulting cities, see also Lt. Col. Milos Postic, Combat
Actions for Centers of Population:East Slavonian Battlefield 1991/92, reprinted and translated in FBIS-EEU, Aug. 1, 1996.
236. OWEN, supra note 226, at 84.

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

See Annexes, 190.
See id. 13.
Johnson, supra note at 81.
See FinalReport of the Commission of Experts, 71 130-34.
1 Annexes to the FinalReport of the Commission of Experts, 9 13-14.
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surrounding countryside, to flee. The sack of Srebrenica, and its
massive refugee flood, is a case in point.2 42
Aside from the removal of ethnic populations, the Serb city
campaign aimed to eradicate vestiges of a multi-ethnic state. The
Serb drive for independence from Bosnian and Croatian statehood
required shattering the cohesive bonds of Yugoslav national unity
that had been forged since WWH. Unlike the rural countryside,
cities of the former Yugoslavia had tended towards accommodation of the many cultures and nationalities comprising their populations.243 Because of their mixed demographic composition, cities
stood as symbols of this multiethnic coexistence, 244 and contrary to
the Serb leadership's appeal to a traditional agrarian ethos.

245

The

siege of Sarajevo, for instance, aimed directly at destroying a symbol of multiethnicity: "Far more than a military target, Sarajevo
stood as a mockery to national exclusiveness." 24 These objectives
were not lost on city residents. As a citizen of Dubrovnik grieved,
"By killing people, not even sparing children, destroying homes,
factories, roads and bridges, closing the national airspace and
blockading sea ports ... Serbia is trying to defeat us retroactively
in our past: it is intent on erasing our historical memory and eliminating us from the consciousness of other nations." 24 7
The Serbs' strategic objectives-in particular their desire to
carve out a viable, ethnically homogenous, and contiguous Serb
state-posed enormous difficulties for the application of the laws
of war. Creating a secure state required gaining control of certain
defensible strips of territory, particularly along major transportation routes. 24 Assertion and protection of these claims, above all
else, drove the parties' conduct during the conflict. As Susan
Woodward observed:

242. See Chris Hedges, Serb Forces Shell U.N. Peacekeepers at Second 'Safe' Area, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 15, 1995, at Al; Stephen Kinzer, Muslims Tell of Atrocities in Bosnian Town,
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1995, at Al; John Pomfret, Serb Forces Renew 'Ethnic Cleansing',
WASH. POST, Oct. 10,1995, at A21.
243. See WOODWARD, supra note 213, at 235-38.
244. See id. at 234.
245. See Nicholas M. Horrock, Burden of History: In Serbs' Eyes, PastJustifies Present,
CIH. TRIB., May 23,1993, at C1.
246. WOODWARD, supranote 213, at 235.
247. Igor Zidic, The Siege of Dubrovnik and the City's Wounds, in DUBROVNIK IN
WAR 59, 61 (Matica Hrvatska ed., 1993).
248. See George Kenney, EndingBosnia's Endgame, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1994, at A33;
Ronald Steel, A Realistic Entity: GreaterSarajevo, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1995, at A19.
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Military strategy in this case was not driven by ethnic hatred, class conflict, or historical aspirations for territory,
but by the geopolitical and institutional preconditions of
sovereignty: obtaining the strategic and economic assets
and borders of a secure future state .... Strategically defensible territories may have little relation to the borders
defined... by the patterns of migration and settlement of
individuals and households ... ; but short of such security, a state is incomplete.2 49
Seen in this light, ethnic cleansing, or at least the forced movement
of populations, was not merely a side effect but the very essence of
the conflict.
C. ProtocolI and the Laws of City-Targeting
While all sides to the conflict recognized that perceived legitimacy or illegitimacy of city attacks had political and strategic significance, the body of norms upon which that legitimacy hinges has
not been clearly articulated in recent years. The Second World
War and the legal regime emanating from it entrenched the
proposition that the character of cities as "military objectives" legitimized their attack.
Protocol I sought repudiation of this liberal proposition by refining the concept of military objective in terms of cities' relation
to military strategy:
Insofar as objects are concerned, military objectives are
limited to those objects which by their nature, location,
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in circumstances ruling at the time, offers
a definite military advantage 50
According to one of the leading commentaries on the Protocols:
This does not require a direct connection with combat
operation .... Thus a civilian object may become a military objective and thereby lose its immunity from delib249. WOODWARD, supra note 213, at 272.

250. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, Aug. 6, 1977, art. 52(2), 1080
U.N.T.S. 371, 16 I.L.M. 1391, reprintedin SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 142, at 652.
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erate attack through use which is only indirectly related
to combat action, but which nevertheless provides an effective contribution to the military phase of a Party's
overall war effort.211
But what constitutes "effective contribution"? The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary on the
Protocols asserts that this broad principle of "military objective"
has long been incorporated into legal conventions, but that its precise meaning has proven elastic5 The previous case shows this all
too well: Allied bombings in WWH effectively melded notions of
military and non-military targets to the point where a target's
mere contribution to a defender's willingness to surrender defined
its "military" character. Similar logic pervaded American planning in the Vietnam War, where aerial bombardments, most notably the "Christmas Bombing" campaign of 1972-73, were intended
to make life "so miserable and wretched for the remaining large
population of Hanoi [that] public pressure would be brought on
the North Vietnamese authorities to resume serious truce negotiations." 3 Despite technological progression and resulting increases in the precision of bombardment from the skies, target sets
have invariably expanded to include not only enemy military assets but targets of political value as well when direct means of destroying an enemy's capacity to wage war have proved evasive.
For similar reasons, the WWIH-era legal regime recognized siege
as a legitimate instrument in warfare. The collocation of combatants and non-combatants, as well as the comparative advantages of
urban defenses, had long justified resort to methods likely to injure the civilian population. In Spaight's words, "The solidarity
between the troops and the inhabitants of a fortified town ... may
almost be said to deprive the latter, temporarily, of their noncombatant character."'' 1 That for centuries urban defenses made
a direct, army-on-army assault militarily unviable meant that attacking forces had to resort to indirect means to achieve capitulation of a city. Consequently, the use of protracted siege opera251. MICHAEL BOTHE Er AL, NEw RuLES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFUCrS:
COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 324 (1982).

252. COMMNTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS 630-35 (Yves Sandoz et al.
eds., 1987).
253. Hamilton DeSaussure and Robert Glasser, in LAW AND RESPONSIBILITY IN
WARFARE: THE VIETNAM EXPERIENCE 119,129 (Peter D. Trooboff ed., 1975).
254. SPAIGHT, supra note 96, at 164.
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tions to starve city occupants, combatants and non-combatants
alike, into submission gained widespread acceptance as a method
of warfare. 5
Following WWII, the Nuremberg Trials affirmed the legitimacy
of starvation as a means of subjugating cities. In the High Command Case, the court deemed lawful Field Marshal von Leeb's order to fire on Russian civilians attempting to escape through German lines during the siege of Leningrad:
A belligerent commander may lawfully lay siege to a
place controlled by the enemy and endeavor by a process
of isolation to cause its surrender. The propriety of attempting to reduce it by starvation is not questioned.
Hence, the cutting off of every source of sustenance from
without is deemed legitimate....
We might wish the law were otherwise but we must ad6
minister it as we find it?5
Similar principles were adopted by the 1956 edition of the United
States Army Field Manual, The Law of Land Warfare: "[I]f a
commander of a besieged place expels the noncombatants in order
to lessen the logistical burden he has to bear, it is lawful, though an
extreme measure, to drive them back, so as to hasten the
surrender.""

The significance of these statements lies not simply in their condoning the use of starvation, however. They also make explicit the
motive--compelling surrender-that justifies its use.28 Starvation
has traditionally been accepted both at the city level and at the national level, as in the case of blockades,2 9 as a legitimate means of
255. See Charles A. Allen, Civilian Starvation and Relief During Armed Conflict: The

Modern HumanitarianLaw, 19 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 82 (1989); Yoram Dinstein,
Siege Warfare and the Starvation of Civilians, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT 145, 150-52 (Astrid J.M. Delissen & Gerard J. Tanja eds., 1991).

256. High Command Case (U.S.A. v. von Leeb et al., 1948), 11 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 563 (1950) (quoting 3 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1802-03

(2d rev. ed. 1945)).
257. U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE

20 (1956).
258. See George Alfred Mudge, Starvation as a Means of Warfare, 4 INT'L LAW. 228,
246 (1970).
259. See id. at 247-51; see also L.C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT 170 (1993) (noting that "[Ilnternational law allows a belligerent to take measures to cut the adverse party off from intercourse with the rest of the world," but inter-
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influencing the decision making of those empowered to capitulate.
As Lauterpacht explained, "The practice of two world wars was
based on the view that no ... sacrosanctity attaches to the civilian
population at large as to make illegal the effort to starve it alongside the military forces of the enemy as a means of inducing him to
surrender."'26 As will be seen below, the purpose of compelling a
surrender lies at the heart of both customary and contemporary
views on the legality of siege.
Since WWII, growing respect for humanitarian concerns and
minimizing civilian suffering has called into question
the legitimacy of specific practices such as von Leeb's brutal siege orders at
Leningrad. 61 A swelling international human fights movement
has at the very least increased global awareness of, and stiffened
public resistance to, the use of starvation as a method of warfare. 6 2 To some scholars and commentators, then, the set of
norms governing attacks on cities has evolved substantially since
the immediate post-WWII period.m To them, Protocol I codified
these changes.
Article 54 of Protocol I prohibits starvation as a method of warfare:
1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.
2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render
useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs... , for the specific
purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to
the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever
the motive ....

preting Protocol I's Article 54 as making illegal those blockades intended to starve the enemy population).

260. H. Lauterpacht, The Problem of tie Revision of the Law of War. 1952 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 360,374.
261. See id. See also GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, at 255 (1994)
(Protocol I "carries to its logical conclusion the concern to protect civilians in wartime
which has headed the [International Humanitarian Law] agenda since the Second World

War.").
262. See Allen, supra note 255, at 48-59 (1989).
263. See eg., Waldemar A. Soil, Protection of CiviliansAgainst the Effects of Hostilities
Under Customary InternationalLaw and Under Protocol 1, 1 AM. U. J. INT'L L & POL'Y
117 (1986).
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3. The prohibitions in paragraph 2 shall not apply to such
of the objects covered by it as are used by an adverse
Party:
(a) As sustenance solely for the members of its armed
forces ....
264

In prohibiting starvation as a means of warfare, the Protocols
deviated from long-standing customary practice.265 Indeed, some
scholars have posited that Protocol I makes all siege warfare illegal.266 To proponents of the Article 54 prohibitions, these provisions reflect a worldwide demand to shatter customary acceptance
in favor of more restrictive norms. As one supporter explained,
"[T]he earlier response of revulsion to such [starvation] practices
has changed to a consensus that they cannot be tolerated in the
modern humanitarian legal order. The starvation article is an apt
'267
reflection of that consensus.

But while there may be a growing international consensus regarding the protection of human rights and reducing unnecessary
suffering, the degree to which that consensus has translated into
positive constraints on the use of starvation as an instrument of
strategy is far from clear. Recent, arguably analogous attempts by
the United States and its allies to impose embargoes against Iraq
and Haiti, even in the face of civilian privations, 261 demonstrate instead a lack of consensus regarding the practical result of modernizing humanitarian order. The precise lines of legality governing efforts to starve an enemy, prior to and after Protocol I,
remain elusive.
264. Protocol I, supra note 250, at art. 54.
265. See BOTHE ET AL., supra note 251, at 336 ("By prohibiting starvation of civilians
as a method of warfare, Art. 54 establishes a substantial new principle of international law
....
");Guy B. Roberts, The New Rules for Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of
Additional Protocol1, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 109, 153 (1985) ("Article 54, by prohibiting starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, establishes a significant new principle of international law."). But see Allen, supra note 255, at 68 ("The Protocol I treatment of starvation in warfare reflects the complexities of the issues and the deference that must be
accorded to the harsh realities of warfare.... Article 54 contains both general humanitarian principles and criteria to guide decision-making during conflict.").
266. See Dinstein, supra note 255, at 150-52; Roberts, supra note 265, at 152-54.
267. Allen, supra note 255, at 82.
268. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Civilian Impact of Economic Sanctions, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT, 274, 295-96 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993); see also Michael R.
Sklaire, Note, The Security Council Blockade of Iraq: Conflicting Obligations Under the
United Nations Charterand the Fourth Geneva Convention, 6 AM. U. J.INT'L L. & POL'Y
609, 624, 635 (1991) (arguing that U.N. sanctions against Iraq violated humanitarian obligations under the Geneva Conventions).
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Similar ambiguities exist with respect to the bombardment of
cities. Protocol I demands that attacking forces minimize the risk
to civilians, even those collocated with military assets. As noted
earlier, Article 52 confines attacks to "military objectives" only.
Article 51 also prohibits attacks that are "of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction,"269 as well as attacks "by bombardment ...which treats as a
single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct
military objectives located in a city, town, [or] village."'", 0 Taken
together, these provisions suggest that bombardment should no
longer be directed at cities as a whole, but must be directed as far
as possible at particular military assets within the city.
To proponents of Protocol I, these restrictions reflect a convergence of law and strategy: In describing Article 51's prohibition of
indiscriminate attacks, for instance, the ICRC's commentary asserts that "most armies endeavor to use accurate weapons as attacks which do not strike the intended objective result in a loss of
time and equipment without giving a corresponding advantage.
... Here, military interests and humanitarianrequirements coincide."''
The conduct of Allied Coalition forces during the 1991
Persian Gulf War, in which allied aircraft utilized precision-guided
munitions when attacking urban targets, might seem to vindicate
the claims of those who argue that Protocol I reflects not only
emerging legal custom but also notions of military effectiveness. It
may even further be read to reflect an apparent rejection of morale bombing-the use of bombardment to erode civilian will to
resist-as an effective military tool. But these claims make assumptions about the "military objective" that may prove tenuous
in other contexts. As the U.S. Defense Department's post-Gulf
War report noted, "'Military advantage' is not restricted to tactical
m
gains, but is linked to the full context of a war strategy ....
".
When the strategic objective sought is rapid destruction of an enemy's military force, then the provisions of Protocol I will generally accord with operational efficiency. But many modem conflicts may demand less direct means to achieve political objectives.
In 1952, the United States adopted a new aerial bombardment
269. Protocol I, supra note 250, at art. 51(4).
270. Protocol I, supra note 250, at art. 51(5)(a).
271. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 252, at 621
(emphasis added); see also Hans Blix, Means and Methods of Combat, in INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 135,145 (UNESCO, 1988).
272. CONDUCT OFTHE PERSIAN GULF WAR, supranote 4, at 613.
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strategy for the Korean War in the face of a stalemate on the
ground and stalled peace talks: "Whenever possible, attacks will
be scheduled against targets of military significance so situated
that their destruction will have a deleterious effect upon the morale of the civilian population actively engaged in the logistic support of enemy forces. '' r7 3 In Vietnam, the United States also tar-

geted cities to compel a favorable negotiated settlement when
direct military solutions seemed untenable. The Serb campaign
against cities similarly reflected a choice of methods deemed consistent with its broader objectives. But can the emerging legal regime intelligibly regulate these methods?
D. The Serb Campaignand the Divergence of Law of Strategy
In many ways, the Serb campaign provides a potentially fruitful
test case for examining the content of the legal regime governing
the attack of cities. Both the International Tribunal274 and Western press coverage 75 focused predominantly on the plight of cities.
The Statute of the International Tribunal authorized the prosecution of persons violating the laws and customs of war, including
"wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not
justified by military necessity," and "attack, or bombardment, by
whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or
buildings. 2

76

International efforts to contain the conflict magni-

fied the role of city attacks and mobilized world public support for
Western intervention. Under U.N. Resolution 824, the Security
Council declared in May 1993 that Sarajevo, Srebrenica, and four
other threatened urban areas would be treated as "safe areas,"
free from armed attack.'r Thereafter, debates about NATO air
strikes or Western military action focused on alleged Serb violations of these provisions, further concentrating international attention on the plight of cities under assaultY 8 Because the war's
drama unfolded across a world-wide stage, the perceived legality
of parties' actions always had potential political consequences, es273. Brig. Gen. Jacob Smart, quoted in CLODFELTER, supranote 137, at 17.
274. See Nab These Criminals,TORONTO STAR, July 13, 1996, at C2.
275. See Georgie Anne Geyer, For the Media, Bosnia Complexity is a Big Photo-Op,
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 22, 1995, at 25 (arguing that the press focused on the siege of Sarajevo
but largely ignored overall geopolitical issues of the conflict).
276. Statute of the International Tribunal art. 3(b), (c).
277. See DICK A. LEURDIJK, THE UNITED NATIONS AND NATO IN THE FORMER

YUGOSLAVIA 42-43 (1994); WOODWARD, supra note 213, at 307-09.
278. See LEURDIJK, supra note 277, at 41-66; Statement by Secretary of State Warren
Christopher, reprintedin 4 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH 584 (1993).
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pecially with respect to Western intervention. A single, wellpublicized incident, like the February 1994 Sarajevo market place
shelling, could generate intense pressure for NATO air strikes. 2 9
The focused attention of international efforts and public opinion
provides a rich series of expressions from which to construct the
legal regime regulating the attack of cities.
This last point, however, cuts both ways. While the extensive
publicity and attention devoted to city attacks provide abundant
data to sift through, many of the accounts are politically chargedthe political sensitivity and the temporal proximity of the conflict
may exert biases that must be borne in mind in any analysis of the
conflict. That caveat noted, even the politically charged reaction
of the international community yields inferences regarding how
cities can expect to be treated in modern conflict.
The publicity and widespread Western condemnation of Serb
sieges and attacks on cities would seem at first glance to bolster
the claims of those arguing that the laws of war have evolved significantly since the post-WWII period. However, close scrutiny of
the International Tribunal's activities and the arguments aired in
the Western press reveal instead only marginal and reluctant deviation from the principles inherited from WWII and earlier. This
analysis also reveals that assumptions inherent in Protocol I's provisions match poorly with the reality of modern conflict.
Some critics of the Tribunal's activities have asserted that, notwithstanding developments such as Protocol I, siege remains a legitimate method of warfare. They invoke customary practice as
evidence, implying that intervening events and international developments have not overridden centuries-long validation of
siege's legality. The most focused debate on siege itself stemmed
from the Tribunal's indictment of a Serb general, Djordje Djukic,
for his participation as logistics commander supporting the siege of
Sarajevo. Although a trial failed to take place due to Djukic's
death,' the debate surrounding the indictment is instructive in itself.
To opponents of the Djukic indictment, siege in the former
Yugoslavia was like siege of centuries past-a legitimate and oftemployed instrument to bring about the surrender of heavily fortified cities:

279. See LEURDLIK, supra note 277, at 51-58; OWEN, supra note 226, at 255-57.
280. See War Crimes Suspect Succumbs to Cancer,N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1996, at A8.
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The real problem with the accusations is their horrible
banality.... Despite the tribunal's allegation that shelling Sarajevo had "no military significance," attacks on civilian areas have been ordered in any number of conflicts, precisely because demoralizing the population can
be militarily very significant.
Did Harry Truman order the A-bombing of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki "in order to kill, injure, terrorize and demoralize the civilian population" of Japan? Of course he
did, and, for the most part, history has treated him kindly
for it. Winston Churchill ordered the firebombing of
Dresden for the same awful reason....
... Djukic is accused of participating in a military siege
not unlike those that have been part of warfare from time
immemorial. 1
The same reasoning echoed in other criticisms of the Djukic
indictment: "The [Djukic] indictment seems troublesome....
Military attacks on civilian targets have become commonplace in
the twentieth century precisely because of the potential for
puncturing the enemy's political will to fight. Exemplary were the
2
World War II firebombings of Dresden and Tokyo ..... ,
Perhaps surprisingly, those demanding Djukic's prosecution
rarely questioned directly the legality of siege. Instead, they
sought to draw distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate
sieges based on the overall objectives underlying strategy. As an
editor for the Bosnian daily Oslobodjenje replied to the abovecited editorial statements:
There is a huge difference, however, between the bombings ordered by Truman or Churchill and those carried
out by Djukic's "Army of Republika Srpska." While the
American and British wartime leaders represented an international alliance fighting fascist regimes that were engaged in aggression and genocide, the Bosnian Serb army

281. Edward Cody, Is It a War Crime, or Just War?, WASH. POST, April 7, 1996, at C5.
282. Bruce Fein, War Crimes Indictment at War with Itself?, WASH. TIMES, April 16,
1996, at A17.
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waged a war that was itself characterized by aggression
and genocide.3
The narrow focus of other Tribunal indictments corroborates
the position that illegality in the Serb campaign was more likely to
lie in the underlying purpose and particular acts of barbarism that
occurred as part of the siege, than in the decision to employ siege
methods in attacking cities. As Richard Goldstone, the former
chief prosecutor for the Tribunal, himself explained:
We have started indicting the most guilty, the Bosnian
Serb leadership, including Radovan Karadzic and Gen.
Ratko Mladic. They have been charged with 36 counts,
including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes which cover instances of unlawful confinement,
murder, rape, sexual assault, torture, beating, robbery,
the sniping and mortaring of innocent civilians during the
horrible years of the siege of Sarajevo, and the destruction of homes, businesses, and places of worship and the
mass killings at Srebrenica.3
Note the emphasis on conduct during siege, but not ordering
sieges themselves.
One commentary on Goldstone's explanation brings to the surface the ambiguity surrounding the legality of siege and the difficulty inherent in viewing conduct during a siege separately from
the act of siege itself:
Indeed, [Goldstone's indictments] leave out some of the
acts perpetrated by Gen. Mladic's forces that those of us
who experienced the war in Bosnia felt and continue to
feel were criminal, notably the siege of Sarajevo itself.
But while sieges are not necessarily violations of the laws
of war, systematic sniping campaigns are. 2as

283. Kemal Kurspahic, Sarajevo's Siege: Crime Not War, WASH. POST, April 17, 1996,
at A23 (emphasis added).
284. Richard Goldstone, Editorial, War Crimes Atrocity Victims in Bosnia Cry Out for
Justice, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 17, 1995, at G1. See also Terry Atlas, Atrocity
Docket UN Has Done Little to Prosecute Villains in Bosnia, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 13, 1994, at 1
(urging that top Serb leadership should be prosecuted for the siege of Sarajevo because
they failed to prevent the deliberate shelling of civilians, not for the siege itself).
285. David Rieff, Arrest Them; The Case Against the Serb War Criminals,WASH. POST,
Sept. 8, 1996, at C1.
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Again, the specific way in which the siege was conducted-and the
strategic objectives that motivated it-emerge as the focus of
condemnation. Even the critics of Serb siege tactics implicitly
seem to acknowledge that siege remains a useful and justifiable
method of war, but that its legality erodes when the civilian
population itself is the primary strategic object of the attacker.
The drafters of Protocol I anticipated these corrupt purposes
and tried to build the injunction against them expressly into the legal regime. Protocol I specifically prohibits starvation with the
motive of forcing the civilian population to move away.2 6 This addition is buttressed by Article 51, which prohibits the direct and
deliberate terrorization of civilians: "The civilian population as
such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of atis
tack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which
' 28
prohibited.
are
population
civilian
the
to spread terror among
Unlike the prohibition of starvation as a means, the principles
behind Article 51 have long appeared in international conventions
and now enjoy almost universal (if only superficial) acceptance as
custom. 288 In adopting language that prohibits attacks whose
"primary purpose" is to spread terror, the Protocols respect the
long-standing distinction present in justifications for starvation:
The legitimacy of those acts of siege whose primary purpose is to
compel military surrender is elevated above that of those aimed at
the civilian population for its own sake. As a corollary, attacks
that incidentally terrorize the civilian population retain legitimacy,
so long as the attack itself is otherwise legal.2 89 That is, the legitimacy of attacks on urban targets turn largely on the intent of the
attacker; so long as terrorization is not the primary goal, even
though it may be a foreseeable (and perhaps desired) one, Article
51 prohibitions lie dormant.290
286. See Protocol I, supra note 250, at art. 54(2) ("It is prohibited to attack, destroy,
remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population..
. for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value ...whether in order
to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.").
287. Protocol I, supra note 250, at art. 51(2). See also BOTHE ET AL., supra note 251, at
300-01 (providing commentary on this provision).
288. See Solf, supra note 263, at 130 ("In general, article 51 reaffirms existing customary
law prohibiting attacks against civilians as such.").
289. See Blix, supra note 271, at 142-43; BOTHE ET AL., supra note 251, at 300-01. Under the prinicples of customary international law, for instance, parties must still comply
with the principle of "proportionality," which demands abstaining from military attacks
against targets when injury to civilians and civilian property would likely be out of proportion to the reasonably expect military advantage. See id. at 276.
290. See Blix, supra note 271, at 143.
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But as noted above, the lines separating levels of intent blur in
practice. Against a well-entrenched enemy, whether at the city or
national level, attackers often attempt to erode enemy public support for continued resistance. Serb attacks on cities, including
shelling and sniping, bring to the surface this tension between the
Protocol's suppositions and perceived strategic reality in the eyes
of warring parties. Abundant evidence reveals that Serb city attacks aimed to drive out non-Serb populations and formed a key
element of Serb "ethnic cleansing." Whereas traditional siege warfare harnessed the incidental impact on non-combatants as a
means towards achieving their military objective, surrender of the
city, Serb siege warfare appeared directed not at "the defending
forces but the inhabitants of the populated areas themselves
... ."291
If expelling portions of a city's population is the aim,
rather than compelling surrender of defending military forces or
disrupting war industries, then it becomes difficult to view siege as
incidentally terrorizing civilians. 2'

The U.N. Commission of Experts attempted to draw this distinction with respect to Serb bombardment of cities and towns:
There are cases in which [Bosnian Serb Army] artillery
has been directed against military objectives and, nevertheless civilian casualties have been caused. In these
cases, it is appropriate to attempt to measure military advantage gained against suffering caused to the civilian
population in a crude proportionality equation. Quite
frequently, however, application of the rule of proportionality will be irrelevant for the simple reason that
causing civilian casualties is the objective of [Bosnian
Serb Army] action, not an incidentaleffect.293
Applying the Protocols to the Yugoslav conflict is troublesome
because the regime they construct does not contemplate the object
of Serb efforts-to expel portions of a population through terrorization-as the very essence of a party's strategic vision.
Once again, the issue of compliance with Protocol I's provisions
is complicated by the particular strategic objectives involved. The
Protocols make implicit assumptions about the way modem wars
are fought, and for what ends. As noted earlier, Protocol I's pro291. Johnson, supra note 209, at 63.
292. See id. at 83.
293. Final Report of the Commission of Experts, 1 83, U.N. Doc. S[1994l674lAnnex
VI.B (emphasis added).
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ponents describe its restrictions as militarily efficient, because concentrated attacks on military assets are the quickest path to victory. But this logic seems at odds with the reality of the Yugoslav
conflict. "The political goal of creating national states made little
distinction between military and civilians, either as fighters or as
targets."2 94 The need to carve out defensible, sovereign states inevitably pit the goals of the opposing armies against the normative
code espoused by proponents of Protocol I.
This is certainly not to condone the conduct or objectives of the
Serb campaign. It is, however, to acknowledge disharmony between the law and strategy in modem conflict. Serb forces terrorized cities not simply to force their individual surrender, nor even
to exploit urban populations' fear to induce capitulation at the national level. The customary legal regime, with its traditionally
permissive standards for besieging cities, was constructed with
these purposes in mind. Rather than utilizing the political relationship between cities, their populations, and states to achieve
their overall objectives, Serb planners sought to sever these relationships. In adopting the "siege" as a primary tool, the Serb
campaign hearkened back to the military campaigns across early
modem Europe. Yet it simultaneously deviated from their purposes, and hence the norms that emerged from that era and remain the focus of modem law.
The Yugoslav conflict exposes further tensions between Protocol I and modern strategy. Articles 51 through 54 attempt the
same transfer of responsibility that the Hague Air Rules' drafters
fought unsuccessfully to achieve in 1923: They further shift the
burden onto the attacker for incidental suffering caused by attempts to subdue a sometimes legitimate military objective.29 As
with the Air Rules, this shift in burden represents a far greater
transformation in the legal regime than the prohibition against a
single method of warfare would suggest. And, like the Air Rules,
this drift may lie too far at odds with accepted practice to gain acceptance as customary law:
The Protocol completely fails to take into account the inherent nature of siege warfare in which starvation of
those within the invested location is not an end but a
means. It is important to bear in mind that a siege does not
294. WOODWARD, supranote 213, at 244.

295. See Allen, supra note 255, at 62; DeSaussure, supra note 146, at 49-50; Dinstein,
supra note 255, at 150-51; Parks, supra note 138, at 112.

1999]

THE LAW AND STRATEGY OF CITIES AS TARGETS

419

generatestarvationfor the purpose of killing civilians with
hunger, but only in order to cause the encircled town to
96
surrender.
Even if one rejects customary practice as a basis for legitimizing
siege, the shift in responsibility from attacker to defender can lead
to paradoxical results. During the interwar years, drafters of aerial
bombardment limitations contended with the predicament that requiring an attacker to avoid certain targets that contain strategic
value might lead the defender to intentionally place civilians at
risk, so as to immunize those targets. In certain contexts, Protocol
I may similarly give the defender the incentive to expose its own
urban residents to the very harm humanitarian law seeks to alleviate.
That much of the fighting and defense of Bosnian and Croat
cities involved local militia units, 29 as opposed to fully organized,
national armies, exacerbated the perverse incentive structure of
urban conflict that the laws of war must confront: not only are civilian non-combatants and military forces and assets all situated in
urban settings, but there may even be operational incentives for
the defender to employ tactics likely to put those civilians at
greater risk. In Sarajevo, for example, the Bosnian Army intentionally dispersed its forces throughout the city to avoid providing
a concentrated target for Serb artillery. 98 As a U.S. Army lawyer
described the Sarajevo situation: "To take the city, the Serbs
would likely have to resort to a house-to-house struggle against a
numerically superior force in an urban area, a fight that certainly
would result in a large number of casualties. Rather than attempt
such a fight, the Serbs have resorted to siege warfare."''
In its
similar assessment of the situation, the U.N. Commission of Experts concluded that "[c]ompliance with the law of armed conflict
is particularly difficult during a siege as in Sarajevo because of the
almost inevitable intermingling of military forces and the civilian
population."3"

296. Dinstein, supra note 255, at 150 (emphasis added).
297. See 1 Annexes to the FinalReport of the Commission of Experts, 1 33, U.N. Doc.
S11994I674lAdd. 2 (1995).
298. See Final Report of the Commission of Experts, 36, U.N. Doc. S1199416741Annex
VI.B.
299. Elliott, supra note 143, at 48-49.
300. Final Report of the Commission of Experts, para. 61, U.N. Doc. S/19941674/Annex
VI.B.
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Indeed, the international sympathy generated by city attacks in
favor of the Bosnian Muslims has led some commentators to view
sieges and bombardments as deliberately encouraged by the
Bosnian government. As David Owen, a chief architect of early
peace plan proposals, charged:
In Sarajevo it became ever clearer that there were in fact
two sieges of the city: one by the Bosnian Serb army, with
shells, sniper fire and blockades, and the other by the
Bosnian government army, with internal blockades and
red tape bureaucracy which kept their own people from
leaving.... In the propaganda war the Serbian siege
aroused the sympathy of the world, and for this [the
Bosnian government] needed the elderly and the children
to stay. It was their most emotive weapon for bringing
the Americans in to fight the war, and they never wanted
it to be weakened.3 1
The Commission of Experts drew similar inferences concerning
the siege of Sarajevo: "It is noted in the Observations Concerning
the Battle History as of July 1993 subsection that both sides have
used the city's logistics as an instrument of war against the populace
to influence each other and affect the media.' '301 Such allegations of
media manipulation remain controversial and disputed. But their
very debate is significant, as it unveils the potentially perverse
consequences of basing the legitimacy of city attacks almost
entirely on the actions of the attacker, the party with the least
control over the placement of a city's military assets and the
distribution of supplies between urban combatants and noncombatants.3 03
Both sides, then, used cities as conduits of terror. The Serbs
used the siege and destruction of cities to spread fear throughout
nearby territory. Their opponents, on the other hand, used it to
spread attention to the outside world.

301. Owen, supra note 226, at 59-60. See also Final Report of the Commission of Experts, para. 75 ("Both sides have used the city's logistics as an instrument of war against
the populace to influence each other and affect the media.").
302. Final Report of the Commission of Experts, para. 75.
303. See Danielle L. Infeld, Note, Precision-Guided Munitions Demonstrated Their
PinpointAccuracy in Desert Storm; But Is a Country Obligated To Use Precision Technology To Minimize Collateral Civilian Injury and Damage? 26 G.W. J.INT'L L. & ECON.
109, 122-23 (1992).
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A strict reading of Protocol I as expressing customary law might
suggest that siege warfare is illegal, except in very limited circumstances (as where no civilians are collocated with besieged combatant forces). But siege methods have long been given leniency
in customary law because they were seen as the only viable means
of securing certain military objectives. While proponents of Protocol I might like to view widespread condemnation of Serb practices as an unquestioned denial of such leniency in the modem era,
the evidence from the Yugoslav conflict fails to bear out this hope.
The international community expressed a reluctance, even among
the strongest condemners of Serb practices, to accept the wholesale rejection of siege as a legitimate instrument.
This reluctance reflects a broader dilemma: The need to carve
out defensible, sovereign states inevitably creates a large discrepancy between the normative concerns of opposing armies and
proponents of Protocol I. The longstanding problem of protecting
cities and their civilian residents is thus compounded in the common context of ethnic strife. In newly-, or not yet-, demarcated
states where minority rights are not adequately protected, some
ethnic groups and their patron states are likely to perceive threats
to their security.30 Even the Dayton Accords themselves, which
have in many respects hardened geographical ethnic divisions in
order to preserve a degree of peaceful stability, reflect this unfortunate reality. 3 5 Despite the efforts of Western commentators and
the International Tribunal, the Yugoslav conflict's legacy is unlikely to forge consensus on the principles championed by Protocol
I's supporters.
VI. CONCLUSION

"Siege," writes Michael Walzer, "is the oldest form of total
war." 3 6 As the preceding cases show, the logic of siege warfare
has reemerged time and again, though in a variety of contexts. It
is indeed a "total" method of warfare, as it targets not the enemy's
304. See Tony Barber, Learning the Bitter Lessons of Bosnia, INDEPENDENT (London),
Mar. 21, 1996, at 17.
305. See Misha Glenny, Editorial, The Price of Peace in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,
1996, at El5; Kemal Kurspahic, Editorial, Two More Years in Bosnia, WASH. POST. Oct.
17,1996, at A23 ("By implementing only military provisions of the Dayton accords, with a
zone of separation as its major achievement, IFOR... has strengthened partition instead
of helping the reintegration of Bosnia."); Michael O'Hanon, Editorial, Bosnia: Better Left
Partitioned,WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1997, at A25.
306. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS, 160 (1977).
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military forces directly but the political relationship between citizens, cities, and states to achieve ultimate strategic objectives.
In early modern Europe, terrorizing a city's population and garrison was justified, in part, as a means of pushing a city to open its
gates. During the American Civil War, terror was similarly harnessed to force capitulation, though this time at the national level.
As cities came to be seen less as independent territorial objectives
and more as constitutive of entire nations, strategy and law shifted
accordingly. In WWII, air planners expected bombing's incidental
terror effects on urban centers to bring the enemy state rapidly to
its knees; the legal regime proved accommodating of such practice.
Though differing in application and scale, all three of these strategic paradigms aimed to compel a political act: surrender.
At a superficial level, the Yugoslav conflict marks a return to
early modern European warfare, as political power to concede a
territorial conqueror's objective lay again at the individual city
level. But rather than exploiting the particular city-state relationship as previous campaigns had attempted, Serb planners aimed to
shatter that relationship, splitting urban populations from their
homes and thereby undermining the integrity of the Bosnian and
Croatian states.
That the laws of siege and city-targeting have received relatively
little academic and juristic attention is surprising, given that these
practices are likely to continue rather than drift into obsolescence.
The high degree of publicity devoted to events like the siege of
Sarajevo might lead one to believe that such attacks stand out as
anomalous in modem conflict. To the contrary, such events are
increasingly the norm. Cities remain, as in centuries past, key centers of power, wealth, and communcation.3 07 During the Soviet
suppression of revolt in Chechnya, for instance, destructive military operations razed the city of Grozny. This example, like the
Yugoslav case, does not merely reflect the special attributes of intrastate warfare. Had the Allied Coalition during Operation Desert Storm elected to occupy Iraq and oust Saddam Hussein's regime, the endgame would inevitably have centered on major cities
such as Basra and Baghdad.
Cities have undergone vast transformations during the past five
centuries. These changes, along with the relationship of the city to
the modem state, have produced shift after shift in military strategy and the conduct of warfare. Despite these changes, some of
307. See Ralph Peters, Our Soldiers, Their Cities, 26 PARAMETERS, 43, 43 (1996).
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them revolutionary, the third element of the triad-the principles
of the law of war governing the attack of cities-has evolved far
more slowly.
To proponents of Protocol I and the principles it embodies, the
current legal regime may provide a degree of protection for cities
and their populations not afforded in prior eras: "Protocol I accomplishes its purpose by modernizing and clarifying the 1907
Hague Regulations in response to the danger presented by modem warfare to the civilian population. ' *01 The war in the former
Yugoslavia should caution against such optimism. International
legal developments can affect the conduct of warfare. But those
striving to construct a more humane legal order must contend wvith
many of the same pressures and dilemmas that have recurred
throughout past centuries' history of cities, law, and strategy. Military and political efforts that raise the costs of inhumane practices
to the perpetrators, therefore altering the strategic calculus that
generates them, are more likely to produce long-term and meaningful results. Otherxvise, as in countless previous conflicts, the
strategic value of cities seems to overwhelm any attempt to proscribe urban targets, or methods of securing them, by resorting to
classifications based on the distinctly "military" nature of targets.
Tragically, cities will not soon escape the force of strategic pragmatism.

308. Solf, supra note 263, at 135.
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